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RESCINDING INCLUSION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:
ADJUDICATING DACA, THE CENSUS, AND THE MILITARY’S
TRANSGENDER POLICY
Peter Margulies*
Abstract
The rescission of programs, policies, and practices by an incoming
administration often raises legal questions. However, answers are harder
to find. That is the case with the whirlwind of rollbacks proposed and
implemented by the Trump administration in areas from transgender
persons in the military to asking a citizenship question on the census and
terminating Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and
Temporary Protected Status (TPS). This Article provides a lens for
assessing the legality of these seemingly precipitous moves. Viewing
these abrupt paradigm shifts as threshold rescissions clarifies the legal
landscape. Threshold measures govern baseline access to goods and
institutions, including military service, political representation, and living
and working legally in the United States. Under current case law, changes
to many threshold measures would be purely discretionary, subject to
very relaxed judicial review or no review at all. This Article suggests that
reliance interests in threshold measures warrant a more robust judicial
role in assessing the means–ends fit of proposed rescissions, equivalent
to intermediate scrutiny in equal protection cases. The prior factfinding
and legislative support invested in reforms slated for rescission further
justify more probing judicial inquiry. The approach urged here also
supplies a welcome normative dimension to scholarly discussions of
administrative constitutionalism. Scholars have highlighted agency
readings to expand individual rights. President Obama’s administration
did this in the context of ending the military’s ban on accession and
retention of transgender service members. The Trump administration
now wishes to partially roll back that inclusive measure. Current
officials’ approach to transgender accession and retention reveals that
administrative constitutionalism is contested terrain: one administration’s
salutary expansion of individual rights strikes a new administration as
defaulting on responsibility, overreaching on power, and interfering with
the rights of other parties. There may be common ground, including
former Defense Secretary James Mattis’s decision to grandfather in
transgender service members who acted in reliance on the Obama
administration’s reform. However, the intermediate scrutiny applied here
would invalidate most other components of the Defense Department’s
transgender rollback, and would require further process and explanation
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before upholding a citizenship question on the census or the termination
of DACA and TPS. In addition, the approach taken here harmonizes with
the United States Supreme Court's finding in the census citizenshipquestion case that the Commerce Department's reliance on Voting Rights
Act enforcement was pretextual. Analyzing the means–ends fit of
threshold rescissions promotes more effective deliberation about abrupt
changes, while allowing a new administration to refine its rationale.
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CONCLUSION....................................................................................... 1477
INTRODUCTION
Rolling back Obama Administration measures has been a signature
move of the Trump Administration. For example, the Trump
Administration has sought to rescind grants of Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS),1
substantially reverse the Obama Administration’s steps toward accession
into the military of transgender individuals,2 and depart from
longstanding practice by asking a question on the United States census
about citizenship status.3 Judicial outcomes have been mixed thus far,
with the United States Supreme Court upholding an injunction against the
census citizenship question4 and granting a stay of lower court injunctions
against the transgender rescission,5 and an appellate court ruling that
challengers to the DACA rescission had stated an equal protection claim.6
1. See Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Attorney Gen., U.S., to Elaine C. Duke,
Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/17_0904_DOJ_AG-letter-DACA.pdf [https://perma.cc/54MP-VN6V];
Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 22, 2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_0622_S1_Memorandum_DACA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A2WR-WW6J]; see also Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1108–09
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (enjoining termination of TPS for Sudan, Haiti, El Salvador, and Nicaragua).
2. See Memorandum from Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S., to James N. Mattis,
Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., and Jefferson B. Sessions III, U.S. Attorney Gen. (Mar.
23, 2018), https://partner-mco-archive.s3.amazonaws.com/client_files/1521897503.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CCD6-PUGD].
3. See Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, to Karen Dunn
Kelley, Under Sec’y for Econ. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4426785-commerce2018-03-26-2.html [https://
perma.cc/HHH2-A6N3]. See generally New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d
502 (S.D.N.Y.) (setting aside Secretary Ross’s decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020
census as arbitrary and capricious), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 953 (2019).
4. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019).
5. See Orders of the Court – Term Year 2018: Order List of January 22, 2019, SUPREME
CT. OF THE U.S. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/
012219zor_8759.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CAN-QBLN]; see also Sarah Grant, Supreme Court
Stays Injunctions in Trans Ban Case: What Happens Now?, LAWFARE (Jan. 22, 2019, 11:44 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-stays-injunctions-trans-ban-case-what-happensnow [https://perma.cc/C3HN-MRWE] (discussing this). In one case, a district court enjoined the
new transgender restrictions, and the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded that decision. See Doe
2 v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 474, 498 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d, Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19
(D.C. Cir. 2019).
6. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 520 (9th Cir.
2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019). The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the DACA
rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L.
No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012)).
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While the substantive law in each of these cases is different,7 the
approaches taken by courts reveal a methodological confusion that goes
beyond substantive distinctions. The confusion arises because
constitutional law has no uniform approach to rollbacks of inclusive
policies. Such an approach is urgently needed, particularly in the areas of
immigration, citizenship, and national security, where the Trump
Administration has been most active.
President Trump’s penchant for upending settled understandings in
law, policy, and rhetoric complicates the courts’ role. It is tempting to
view President Trump as a rogue president who has compromised his
own oath of office and thus merits more rigorous judicial review than
other occupants of the White House.8 However, the Supreme Court has
already cautioned against this course, noting that courts reviewing actions
by President Trump are, as with judicial review of decisions by other
presidents, necessarily reviewing “the Presidency itself.”9 Pivoting too
hastily from courts’ traditional deferential posture on national security
and immigration can obscure the “delicate” touch required in assessing
presidential statements and decisions.10 As the Court suggested in Trump
v. Hawaii,11 the courts have to fashion rules that apply to all subsequent
occupants of the White House—not just Donald Trump.12
Similarly, courts must recognize that in the context of democratic
governance, administrative rescissions are a feature, not a bug.
Individuals running for president regularly define their candidacies in
Id. This Article focuses only on the constitutional issues, although administrative law scholarship
informs its analysis.
7. Transsubstantive legal norms have received increased attention from scholars. See
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 38 (2001) (analyzing implementation
of constitutional norms); William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130
HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1107–12 (2017) (discussing interpretive rules); Mitchell N. Berman,
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 30–50 (2004) (analyzing prophylactic rules such
as Miranda that promote compliance with constitutional rights); Robert M. Chesney, National
Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1362–66 (2009) (discussing national security and
foreign relations context); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law
Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650–52 (2005) (discussing links between
judicial practice and legal norms); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213–37 (1978) (discussing how
the selection of a legal standard causes under- or over-enforcement of norms).
8. See generally Andrew Kent et al., Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (examining the origin of the U.S. Constitution’s “faithful execution”
requirement upon the President).
9. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018) (upholding on both constitutional and
statutory grounds President Trump’s proclamation limiting immigration from certain majorityMuslim countries, as well as North Korea and Venezuela).
10. Id.
11. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
12. Id. at 2418.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss6/3

4

Margulies: Rescinding Inclusion in the Administrative State: Adjudicating DA

2019]

RESCINDING INCLUSION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

1433

contrast to the policies of the current chief executive.13 In the
administrative law sphere, “exits” from a previous administration’s
initiatives are a stock in trade of presidential transitions.14 Moreover,
these pivots can stem from fundamental disagreements about the contours
of constitutional law. One administration’s expansion of rights through
agency action can be a subsequent administration’s bureaucratic
overreaching.
Agency expansions of rights can trigger three kinds of conflicts. First,
and perhaps most obviously, an expansive agency view of rights may
conflict with a subsequent administration’s view of its constitutional
responsibility to protect the nation’s safety. For example, former
Secretary of Defense James Mattis asserted that the need to maintain
combat readiness and foster the cohesion of military units required a
partial rollback of the inclusive policy on transgender service members
announced by the Obama Administration.15 Second, as in the reaction to
President Obama’s immigration initiatives such as DACA,16 expansions
of rights or benefits through unilateral agency action may trigger concern

13. James Risen, The Executive Power Awaiting the Next President, N.Y. TIMES (June 22,
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/weekinreview/22risen.html [https://perma.cc/
E9NN-KRT2] (reporting that then-candidate Barack Obama was “sharply critical” of the
“expansive” view of presidential power taken by then-president George W. Bush). Candidate
Donald Trump’s criticism of President Obama was more personal and invidious, in its false
premise that Obama was not a natural-born citizen of the United States. See Maggie Haberman &
Alan Rappeport, Trump Drops False ‘Birther’ Theory, but Floats a New One: Clinton Started It,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/us/politics/donald-trumpbirther-obama.html [https://perma.cc/46RL-4LLM] (reporting that, after five years of steadfastly
maintaining his “birther” claim, then-candidate Trump backed away from that position in the final
weeks of the 2016 campaign).
14. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Presidential Exit, 67 DUKE L.J. 1729, 1732–34 (2018)
[hereinafter Rulh & Salzman, Presidential Exit]; J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulatory Exit, 68
VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2015) [hereinafter Ruhl & Salzman, Regulatory Exit].
15. Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 917 F.3d 694, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
16. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 180 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally
divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 6 [], Art. 3

1434

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

about excessive use of government power.17 Third, rights may conflict,
spurring efforts to halt or temper reforms.18
Each of these rationales for rescission also complicates the analysis of
both the rollback and the previous measure as forms of what scholars
have recently called administrative constitutionalism. Groundbreaking
works of administrative constitutionalism have related how
administrative agencies have expanded the content of constitutional
rights through rules on conscientious objection from the military draft,19
welfare programs,20 and employment law.21 The measures that the Trump
17. See Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825, 872–73 (2015) [hereinafter
Tani, Administrative Equal Protection] (noting that after New Deal federal welfare officials and
their successors had sought for over twenty years to combat arbitrary and invidious state policies,
a longtime official wrote an influential memorandum warning against tying federal funding to
southern states’ integration); cf. KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND
AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935–1972, at 248 (2016) [hereinafter TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY]
(describing 1960s federal officials’ politically-based wariness about taking a public stance
favoring vigorous enforcement of a newly enacted federal civil rights statute barring racial
discrimination in programs receiving federal funds). Earlier, U.S. military lawyers had argued
after America’s entrance into World War I that the Wilson Administration’s expansive definition
of conscientious objector status—crafted by then-War Department lawyer and future Supreme
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter—exceeded executive power under a statute that had narrowly
defined conscientious objection to the draft. See Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins
of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1111–22, 1138–39 (2014) (discussing
Justice Frankfurter’s memorandum on the subject and military lawyers’ opposing argument that
Justice Frankfurter’s expansive definition, rooted in civil liberties, conception of the military as
embodying American freedoms, and presidential discretion contravened clear statutory
command).
18. See generally New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502 (discussing,
but then rejecting, the position taken by the Justice Department that a citizenship question on the
census was necessary to implement Voting Rights Act and implement one-person-one-vote
principle by preventing vote dilution). This abiding concern animated the D.C. Circuit’s
invalidation of Federal Communications rules requiring broadcasters to adopt certain kinds of
affirmative action programs. See Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 353–56
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
19. Kessler, supra note 17.
20. See TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY, supra note 17; Tani, Administrative Equal
Protection, supra note 17.
21. See, e.g., Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism
and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 800–01 (2010). Other scholars have
addressed how agencies can set up internal watchdogs that promote constitutional values and
moderate agency moves that may overreach, especially in national security. See generally Shirin
Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 65
STAN. L. REV. 1027 (2013) (discussing safeguards against government overreaching provided by
inspectors general); Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s
Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 112, 194 (2015) (arguing that placement of
privacy officers in compliance units has beneficial effects, but it also frustrates integration of civil
liberties concerns into initial policy formulation).
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Administration has sought to rescind fall under administrative
constitutionalism’s rubric. In each case, prior administrations have
sought to expand conceptions of rights beyond what prior case law or the
express language of the Constitution or statutes provided.22
In seeking to roll back these measures, the Trump Administration has
invoked its constitutional responsibility, the limits on presidential power,
and prior measures’ failure to adequately protect other rights. Rescission
is therefore not merely about a new democratically elected president
rolling back the product of a predecessor’s constitutional vision; it also
requires courts to sort out competing visions of administrative
constitutionalism. Because the work of administrative constitutionalists
has centered on a rich historical account of executive branch officials’
perspectives and decisions, it has tended to focus less on the normative
analysis of judicial approaches or the normative ordering of competing
versions of constitutionalism.23 This Article aims to fill that gap.
This Article’s approach addresses threshold agency measures. In this
Article, threshold measures concern fundamental access points. To
qualify as a threshold, access must include an agency or entity’s
application of criteria that limit participation based on race, gender, or
sexual orientation, restrict the ability to work legally and remain in the
United States, or adversely affect participation in the political system.
Moreover, to qualify as threshold rescissions, agency shifts must
adversely affect reliance interests.
This approach covers a narrow subset of agency rescissions. Most
regulatory changes, including those addressing regulation of industrial,
commercial, or financial processes, would not qualify. In other words,
22. See Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship,
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 105, 107 (2014)
(asserting that DACA stemmed from a vision of inclusion and equity in pre-presidential writings
of then-senator Barack Obama and echoed earlier uses of presidential authority to safeguard
“intending Americans” from adverse actions by non-federal sovereigns). Scholars have also
cautioned that expanding certain rights beyond judicial precedent or express statutory parameters
may impinge on others’ rights or trigger other adverse effects. See David E. Bernstein,
Antidiscrimination Laws and the Administrative State: A Skeptic’s Look at Administrative
Constitutionalism, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1387–89 (2019) (criticizing Obama
Administration officials’ advice to college administrators to strengthen procedures for
investigating and adjudicating students’ sexual assault claims as impinging on rights of the
accused and suggesting that perceived excesses of this policy guidance reveal normative gaps in
administrative constitutionalist literature).
23. To be sure, scholars have addressed the interaction of case law and administrative
constitutional visions. See Tani, Administrative Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 885–99.
However, for administrative constitutionalists, historical and descriptive questions have been
more pressing than normative concerns, in part because this emerging strand of scholarship has
viewed much traditional court-centered legal academic work as neglecting the study of
administrative officials’ thought.
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this Article does not aim to constitutionalize vast stretches of
administrative law. Most proposed changes will continue to be assessed
largely under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).24 Most
discretionary agency decisions, including individual decisions on
whether to prosecute or commence regulatory proceedings, will not be
covered and indeed may not be reviewable at all.25
This Article argues that courts should subject threshold rescissions to
intermediate scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, a party challenging a
threshold rescission would need to show only that the rescission was not
tailored to serve a significant government interest.26 Particularly in the
national security and foreign relations arena, this standard is more robust
than the deferential review that courts usually conduct.27 Moreover, this
standard does not require proof of discriminatory intent, which current
equal protection doctrine would require in most other contexts.28
Three factors justify this more robust standard. First, threshold
rescissions impair reliance interests. For example, the transgender service
members who disclosed their identity after the Obama Administration
announced its more inclusive policy would be at risk under a total
rescission.29 Indeed, the 2018 Mattis policy that restores some limits
recognizes this problem by giving certain transgender service members
the right to continue in the military.30 Second, courts’ institutional
24. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559,
701–706 (2012)).
25. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (holding that most agency
decisions not to initiate proceedings against specific targets were unreviewable because they
involved balancing variables including available agency resources regarding which agency had
superior knowledge, and courts were ill-equipped to intervene). Agency rescissions may trigger
statutory issues—including those under the APA—but those issues are not this Article’s focus.
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 530 (2009) (upholding FCC change to
application of broadcast indecency policies under APA). In Fox, Justice Scalia disparaged the
notion that a mere regulatory change, even one involving constitutional issues such as free speech,
should necessarily trigger more exacting scrutiny under the APA. Id. at 515–16. However, Justice
Scalia did note that in explaining a rescission, an agency should take into account “serious reliance
interests.” Id. at 515. This Article stems from a comparable intuition, although it defines reliance
interests in a broader fashion. For analysis of Fox, see William W. Buzbee, The Tethered
President: Consistency and Contingency in Administrative Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1399–
1400 (2018); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 483–86 (2010).
26. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017).
27. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419–20 (2018).
28. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
29. See German Lopez, Trump’s Ban on Transgender Troops, Explained, VOX (Jan. 22,
2019, 11:12 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/7/26/16034366/trump-transgendermilitary-ban [https://perma.cc/4K9F-A7TB].
30. See Memorandum from James N. Mattis, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Donald
J. Trump, President of the U.S. (Feb. 22, 2019), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Mar/23/
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competence favors a more robust standard; courts have the benefit of
prior administrative fact-finding favoring a more inclusive measure.31 On
the census, for example, a succession of officials from both parties
supported the Census Bureau’s expert judgment that a citizenship
question would deter responses.32 Third, a previously promulgated
inclusive measure will often have a significant quantum of support in
Congress. DACA, for example, enjoyed a substantial quantum of
bipartisan legislative support.33
Robust means–ends scrutiny would require the government to show
more in threshold rescissions. On the rescission of the Obama
Administration’s inclusive transgender military policy, intermediate
scrutiny would disaggregate the rescission’s components. Courts should
2001894037/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-SERVICE-BY-TRANSGENDER-INDIVIDUALS.PDF
[https://perma.cc/5XUQ-Z6S9].
31. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed courts’ relative lack of expertise and access
to data on difficult national security decisions. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (“[W]hen it comes
to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences [regarding national security] . . . ‘the lack
of competence on the part of the courts is marked’” (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010))); cf. Chesney, supra note 7, at 1362–66 (discussing traditional judicial
deference).
32. La Unión del Pueblo Entero v. Ross, 353 F. Supp. 3d 381, 392–95 (D. Md. 2018); New
York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 315 F. Supp. 3d 766, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
33. See Kevin R. Johnson, Lessons About the Future of Immigration Law from the Rise and
Fall of DACA, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 368 (2018) (noting support for DACA from Speaker
Paul Ryan and Senator Orrin Hatch). The congressional support for DACA, coupled with a history
of presidential actions to protect intending Americans, was arguably sufficient to constitute
legislative acquiescence. See Margulies, supra note 22, at 107–08. Legislative acquiescence
would entitle the inclusive measure to a middling level of judicial deference under Justice
Jackson’s landmark framework parsing executive power. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also id. at 610–11
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing importance of historical “gloss” gleaned from pattern of
congressional–executive branch interactions over time); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550,
2567 (2014) (affirming the importance of historical perspective on active and tacit understandings
between the political branches); cf. Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in 233,
273–75 PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009)
(discussing the history of Youngstown litigation). See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W.
Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012) (tracing
the development of the view that a pattern of legislative acquiescence broadens judicial deference
to executive power); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Congress and the President in Wartime, LAWFARE
(2017) (reviewing David Barron’s book, Waging War: The Clash Between Presidents and
Congress, 1776 to ISIS) (discussing challenges in determining where among Justice Jackson’s
categories
the
particular
exercise
of
wartime
executive
power
fits),
www.lawfareblog.com/congress-and-president-wartime [https://perma.cc/29ML-LQAN]. A
measure like DACA may be too recent to claim the mantle of historical “gloss.” Moreover,
approval of DACA was certainly not unanimous among legislators. However, demonstrations of
bipartisan support, such as Speaker Ryan and Senator Hatch’s support for DACA, go some way
toward showing the rescinded measure’s democratic pedigree.
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acknowledge the 2018 Mattis policy’s grandfathering in of certain
transgender service members and its inclusion of some individuals who
identify with a gender other than their assigned one. Moreover, a
significant component of the 2018 policy—its requirement of thirty-six
months of stability for new recruits—would pass muster. However, the
2018 policy’s bar on accession of transitioned individuals would fall, as
would its bar on retention of persons outside of the grandfathered group
who in the future require accommodations or medical treatment. The
census citizenship question would require more testing, while the
rescissions of DACA and TPS respectively would require more
comprehensive explanation than the Trump Administration has
provided.34
A more deliberative democracy would emerge from disaggregating
the parts of the 2018 transgender policy and requiring more elaboration
about the census, DACA, and TPS. Courts do a disservice to both
democracy and deliberation by failing to separately parse the transgender
policy’s principal features and analyzing each on its own merits.35 That
more nuanced analysis also highlights the 2018 policy’s stilted and static
account of unquestioned virtues such as unit cohesion. With respect to
the census, DACA, and TPS, the additional elaboration required by the
approach taken here would realign incentives, encouraging an
administration to develop sound justifications before it issued a rescission
in the first place. That prophylactic ex ante effect will surely aid the cause
of deliberation that the Framers embraced.
By allowing both continuity and flexibility in addressing a
predecessor’s inclusive initiatives, the approach taken here also seeks to
provide a normative dimension to the administrative constitutionalist
literature, which has often stressed descriptive and historical
perspectives. Highlighting the judicial role could be viewed as a
distraction from administrative constitutionalists’ focus on agencies as an
antidote to preoccupation with the courts, Congress, or the President.
However, perhaps this piece can instead facilitate further engagement
between normative analysis and administrative constitutionalism’s
salutary historical work.
This Article unfolds in four parts. Part I discusses the approach taken
here, introducing administrative constitutionalism as a framework,
discussing its normative tensions, and addressing the need for more
robust means–ends scrutiny of threshold rescissions. Part II analyzes the
34. In the census, DACA, and TPS rescissions, challengers would also be able to show
discriminatory intent, which the traditional test requires, although the approach outlined in this
Article does not.
35. See Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (contrasting Secretary
of Defense Mattis’s policy and President Trump’s tweets in the course of vacating a district court
injunction against the new transgender restrictions).
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2018 transgender policy in light of this approach. Part III discusses the
census. Part IV addresses both DACA and TPS. Each situation entails
competing versions of administrative constitutionalism. Ranking those
iterations through means–ends scrutiny will help safeguard deliberative
democracy.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
THRESHOLD RESCISSIONS
Scholars of administrative constitutionalism have argued that
agencies regularly make decisions that revise or expand constitutional
interpretation.36 Yet, as these scholars have recognized, since agencies
are a “they,” not an “it,”37 decisions that expand certain aspects of
constitutionalism can also trigger pushback from regulatory colleagues.38
Indeed, that pushback often entails competing visions of
constitutionalism, stemming from disagreements regarding agency
responsibility, authority, and concern for conflicting rights.39

36. See Lee, supra note 21, at 800–01; TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY, supra note 17, at
246; Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1901–02 (2013)
(discussing issues of legitimacy in agency actions that rely on constitutional interpretation,
particularly when that interpretation is only thinly acknowledged in agency rationale).
Administrative constitutionalist scholars have noted parallels between this school of thought and
other recent work on how non-judicial actors construct constitutional meaning. See Keith E.
Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 120, 128
(2010); see also Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV.
519, 553–61 (2015) (analyzing how administrative interpretations aid in the process of
“experimentalism” and thus further the adaptation of constitutional principles to contemporary
needs).
37. In other words, agencies are not unitary; they often feature tensions between different
officials and units within the agency that interact with different stakeholders and have competing
agendas. Scholars from a range of points on the ideological spectrum recognize this reality. See
Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV. 139,
164–65 (2018); Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive
Branch is a “They,” Not an “It,” 96 MINN. L. REV. 194, 197 (2011); Tani, Administrative Equal
Protection, supra note 17, at 864–67 (discussing tensions within federal agencies regulating state
provision of welfare benefits regarding scope of federal authority to require that states allocate
benefits fairly and equally).
38. See Memorandum from Rufus Miles, Admin. Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ.
and Welfare, to the Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ. and Welfare (Jan. 9, 1960) (on file with the
author) (cautioning administrators against using broad constitutional reading to support what
Miles viewed as an unduly aggressive use of threat of federal funding termination to shape state
welfare criteria); cf. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 872–73 (discussing
Miles’s view). I am indebted to Professor Tani for making a copy of this memorandum available.
39. See Miles, supra note 38, at 3 (urging administrators to stay within agency’s
“responsible exercise of its proper role without over-reaching”).
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A. Administrative Constitutionalism and Individual Rights
Administrative constitutionalists have focused most closely on agency
expansions of rights. They have argued, based on careful and compelling
review of agency records and correspondence, that agencies have
promoted rights beyond what courts at a particular time required in a
range of areas, including conscientious objection to the military draft,
welfare benefits, and fair employment.40 For example, Karen Tani writes,
officials at agency precursors of today’s Department of Health and
Human Services invoked constitutional values of due process and equal
protection to curb states that sought to restrict on moralistic or other
grounds indigent families’ access to government benefits.41 Sophia Lee
has studied efforts by the Federal Communications Commission to
promote fair employment and diverse workplaces for broadcast
licensees.42 Jeremy Kessler has written about the efforts of War
Department lawyers like future Supreme Court Justices Felix Frankfurter
and Harlan Stone.43 During World War I, Frankfurter and Stone expanded
the definition of conscientious objector status beyond Congress’s
definition to include “unorganized” objectors who did not belong to any
distinct religious group but nonetheless expressed sincere and profound
opposition to participation in armed conflict.44 In a number of the cases
studied by administrative constitutionalist scholars, the courts or
Congress eventually expanded rights that the agencies had previously
recognized, although in most cases neither branch went as far in
expanding rights as the high-water mark in agency officials’ own
aspirations.45
40. See TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY, supra note 17, at 71 (welfare benefits); Kessler,
supra note 17, at 1133–36 (conscientious objection); Lee, supra note 21, at 801 (employment);
Reuel E. Schiller, Comment, The Administrative State, Front and Center: Studying Law and
Administration in Postwar America, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 415, 422 (2008) (free speech and
censorship).
41. See generally Tani, Administrative Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 867–73
(discussing agency’s interactions with Louisiana over state rules that limited the benefits available
to mothers with children born out of wedlock).
42. See Lee, supra note 21, at 811–18 (discussing FCC officials’ emerging interest in
Kennedy administration in requiring licensees to practice fair employment).
43. Kessler, supra note 17.
44. Kessler, supra note 17, at 1111–23.
45. See Tani, Administrative Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 884–90 (discussing the
Warren Court’s case law and other pro-recipient decisions, although as part of the ebb and flow
of constitutional law noting later more pro-state precedents of the Burger Court, such as
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), which limited constitutional claims by upholding
state discretion to cap total welfare benefits available to any family per month so that parents with
more dependent children received proportionately reduced amounts for each child). During the
New Deal and World War II, federal agency lawyers had an extraordinary influence on the
legislative process, including close contact with members of Congress drafting statutes and
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Yet the administrative constitutionalism revealed in such innovations
was arguably just one of several competing forms of administrative
constitutionalism within the agency and among its many stakeholders. To
temper the vision of expanded rights that administrative constitutionalism
furthered, another competing vision stressed the limited powers of the
federal government. For example, when federal welfare officials sought
to invoke the Constitution to prevent Louisiana from conditioning receipt
of welfare benefits on a parent’s provision of a “suitable home” for
children, a longtime federal welfare administrator warned that neither the
Constitution nor any federal statute allowed officials to use federal funds
as leverage to prod the state into compliance with officials’ views.46 As
the senior official cautioned, an expansive administrative constitutional
interpretation would constitute the exercise of “unrestrained power,”
“usurp the proper role of the courts,” and “over-reach the role of the
Executive Branch.”47
Similarly, government lawyers opposed to the expansive vision of
conscientious objector status articulated by Justices Frankfurter and
Stone argued that Congress, in exercising its constitutional power to set
rules for the armed forces, had expressly demarcated the bounds of that
status.48 For these internal critics, expanding the definition beyond
Congress’s express limits would contravene Congress’s authority.49
While the courts ultimately held that the First Amendment required a
broader definition, that development occurred much later—well after the
conclusion of World War I.50 But Justices Frankfurter and Stone’s push
past Congress’s limits occurred immediately. And Justice Frankfurter’s
memorandum on the subject devoted no space whatsoever to the
separation of powers concerns raised by his proposed policy or even to

legislative history, as well as including legislative history in briefs in those pre-Internet days when
such materials were often difficult for other litigants to find. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan
and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative
History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 338–42 (2013). Agency influence during this formative
period surely contributed to administrators’ sense of the leverage they could wield in both
interpretation and implementation.
46. See Miles, supra note 38.
47. Id. at 2–3. Courts eventually found that some of these state practices violated federal
law. See Tani, Administrative Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 867–73 (discussing the
Louisiana “suitable home[s]” controversy).
48. See Kessler, supra note 17, at 1126–27.
49. Id.
50. Cf. id. at 1161–63 (discussing the evolution of Justices Frankfurter and Stone’s thinking
after their appointments to the Supreme Court and the latter’s increased focus on judicial
protections for civil liberties).
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specific discussion of the First Amendment, preferring to center on
executive discretion.51
In other cases, competing visions of administrative constitutionalism
stressed the rights or interests of other individuals. For example, the
senior federal official’s warning about overreaching in policing
restrictive state welfare rules also cautioned about the negative impact of
terminating federal funds to the state on other indigent individuals or
institutions that received benefits.52 A few years after the senior official’s
warning, Congress enacted legislation that conditioned receipt of federal
funding on compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws.53 Courts
have upheld such legislation as an appropriate exercise of legislative
power under the Spending Clause.54 However, in the absence of such
clear legislative authority, the senior official’s concern was legitimate.55
One can argue that swift and decisive action was necessary to deter
punitive and moralistic state policies, especially when those policies also
contained a racial dimension. But counterarguments should not obscure
the importance of a full internal policy debate as well as legislative input.
Some officials’ push to scuttle state restrictions may have submerged
these other considerations.
In addition, critics of certain iterations of administrative
constitutionalism contended that the expansive readings of rights
undermined federal responsibility for national security grounded in the
Constitution itself. Government lawyers opposing Justices Frankfurter
and Stone’s expansive reading of conscientious objector status argued
strenuously that the military needed all potential personnel for the war

51. Id. at 1111–23; Justice Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum for the Secretary of War:
Treatment of Conscientious Objectors 2 (Sept. 18, 1917) (discussing conscientious objector status
as an “administrative or military problem concerning the use to which certain men called to the
colors are to be put in view of their peculiar fitness or unfitness”) (manuscript on file with the
author). I am indebted to Jeremy Kessler for access to a copy of this memo.
52. See Miles, supra note 38, at 2 (warning of consequences of hypothetical federal funding
cut-off to state “land-grant colleges” or “church-supported schools”). Federal funding
terminations continue to be a fraught endeavor. See Eloise Pasachoff, Agency Enforcement of
Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense of the Funding Cut-Off, 124 YALE L.J. 248, 334 (2014)
(urging more tenacious federal enforcement of grant conditions).
53. See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601–605, 78 Stat.
241, 252–53 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-7 (2012)).
54. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 576–78 (2012) (analyzing
parameters of Congress’s spending power).
55. Current concerns expressed by some Justices of the Supreme Court take this argument
a step further, asserting that the Constitution forbids excessive delegations from Congress to
agencies. See Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 24–28 (2017). But questions about whether agency action in a particular case fits within
Congress’s delegation do not rely on this more radical position.
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effort, which would be hobbled by less than full participation.56 The
relatively modest number of conscientious objectors, even under Justices
Frankfurter and Stone’s more expansive paradigm, suggests that this fear
was overblown. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge this strand
of opposition, which stems from the legitimate government interest in
successful prosecution of the war effort.57
In sum, celebrating administrative constitutionalism is both salutary
and perilous. Acknowledging the resourceful responses of sometimes
beleaguered administrators to unfairness and inequality is important and
overdue. A deep descriptive dive into those courageous administrators’
actions reveals much about the origins of constitutional rights. It also
offers, as in the welfare officials’ vision, tantalizing hints of a more
positive government duty to assist people living in poverty. Yet, these
salutary effects could also benefit from a normative frame that considers
transitions to and from such expansive readings in light of competing
concerns, which often themselves have constitutional ramifications.
B. The Role of the Courts in Assessing Threshold Rescissions
Many rescissions of administrative constitutionalist measures should
not trigger constitutional concerns. In some cases, resulting friction plays
out in both the political realm and the court of public opinion. In other
cases, the APA alone is sufficient to address the issue.58 Under this
Article’s approach, the Constitution is relevant to what this Article calls
“threshold” rescissions.
An agency’s threshold rules can be internal or external. Either way,
they govern access to basic goods and attributes, such as baseline criteria
for participation in the entity, or core interests with a constitutional
dimension, such as the ability to remain in the United States or the
apportionment of political representatives.59 Rescissions of such
threshold rules trigger substantial collateral impacts, through either
creation of orphan groups protected by earlier rules but subject to post56. Kessler, supra note 17, at 1090.
57. See generally Matthew C. Waxman, The Power to Wage War Successfully, 117 COLUM.
L. REV. 613 (2017) (discussing this interest as articulated in 1917 by Charles Evans Hughes).
58. See Ruhl & Salzman, Presidential Exit, supra note 14, at 1731–32, 1746 n.83; cf. FCC
v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 530 (2009) (upholding turn to broader FCC
application of broadcast indecency policies); Metzger, supra note 25, at 483–84 (critiquing Fox).
While this Article’s approach would have required more exacting review in Fox, a full analysis
of that case is beyond this Article’s scope.
59. An agency’s rules governing the ability of an entity to broadcast speech would also fit
under this rubric. But see Fox, 556 U.S. at 515–16 (asserting that an agency’s pivot to more
vigorous regulation of allegedly indecent speech on public broadcasts, while it touched on matters
governed by the First Amendment, did not necessarily require additional justification under the
APA, if the agency action was itself constitutional).
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rescission discrimination, or disruption of collaborative endeavors
involving both the direct subject of regulation and third parties. This
creates a narrow subset of changes subject to constraint. Most regulatory
changes, including those addressing regulation of industrial, commercial,
or financial processes, do not constitute threshold rescissions.
As an example of a threshold rescission, consider President Woodrow
Wilson’s efforts to segregate federal officials. Until the Wilson
Administration, the federal civil service had been racially integrated since
the nineteenth century.60 This institutional commitment to racial
integration reflected a distinctively administrative commitment to
equality, since courts had signaled by 1896 that government segregation
was constitutional.61 Wilson forcefully resegregated the federal
government, fundamentally changing working conditions on the basis of
race.62 Pivoting back toward equality, after World War II President Harry
Truman changed the military’s threshold institutional criteria when he
required racial integration of U.S. armed forces.63 Congress did not
mandate this, 64 and the Supreme Court did not prohibit segregation in
public schools until several years later.65 One can understand former
Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s lifting of the ban on transgender
individuals in the same light.66 Former Defense Secretary Mattis’s
restrictions on transgender service in and accession to the armed forces
count as a partial threshold rescission of Carter’s policy.67
There are three reasons that threshold rescissions warrant higher
scrutiny than other measures, even absent proof that such rescissions
involved the intent to discriminate against a suspect or quasi-suspect class
defined by race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, or national
60. See David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in
Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 797, 800 (1998).
61. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. See Bernstein, supra note 60.
63. See Robert Knowles, The Intertwined Fates of Affirmative Action and the Military, 45
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1027, 1049 (2014).
64. Theo Lippman, Jr., For Truman, Desegregation Was a Political Move, BALT. SUN
(Aug. 9, 1998), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1998-08-09-1998221064-story.html
[https://perma.cc/LML3-P2X3] (“[I]n February 1948, Truman called on Congress for ‘modern,
comprehensive civil rights laws.’ Congress more or less ignored that, so black leaders called for
executive action.”).
65. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
66. See Press Release, Dep’t of Def., Secretary of Defense Ash Carter Announces Policy
on Transgender Service Members (June 30, 2016), https://dod.defense.gov/News/NewsReleases/News-Release-View/Article/821675/secretary-of-defense-ash-carter-announces-policy
-for-transgender-service-members/ [https://perma.cc/6XBJ-MPYT].
67. See Memorandum from Donald J. Trump, supra note 2.
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origin.68 First, threshold rescissions adversely affect reliance interests.
Second, they typically do not pose the same threat to institutional
competence posed by review of other rescissions. Third, threshold rules
that a new administration seeks to rescind often have substantial support
in the legislative sphere, demonstrating a significant degree of
congressional acquiescence. This Article considers each in turn.
Many threshold rescissions leave orphan groups in their wake, which
had received access or other goods under a previous expansion of
threshold criteria. A rescission will prejudice the interests of such groups.
Consider again President Wilson’s resegregation of the federal
government. 69
While African-American officeholders were not formally terminated,
a cluster of related measures made them unwelcome.70 In some cases,
senior officials pursuing Wilson’s policy shifted African-American civil
servants into separate units that were later eliminated.71 Transfers were
particularly common when African-American men had previously
supervised white female civil servants.72 A number of the most prominent
African-American officials retired shortly after the segregationist
policies’ implementation.73 Within the Wilson Administration, officials
justified these adverse impacts not by overt appeals to animus, but instead
by references to the supposed “friction” between the races that
segregation would ease.74 Nevertheless, the signal received by white
middle managers in the administration was clear: “Forces defending
racial equality . . . gave way to long-latent desires for discrimination.”75
68. Under current doctrine, heightened scrutiny would require either an express
classification based on suspect or quasi-suspect criteria, proof of intentional discrimination when
express discrimination was absent, or interference with fundamental rights such as voting. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (requiring proof of discriminatory purpose). See
generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59 (2017)
(discussing doctrine dividing scrutiny into tiers depending on the nature of the classification at
issue).
69. Nancy J. Weiss, The Negro and the New Freedom: Fighting Wilsonian Segregation, 84
POL. SCI. Q. 61, 61 (1969).
70. See generally, e.g., id. (discussing racially charged measures undertaken by the Wilson
administration).
71. See id. at 64.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 66.
74. Id. at 71 (“Wilson, dismissing any political considerations, ‘said that the policy of
segregation had been enforced for the comfort and best interests of both races in order to overcome
friction.’”). See generally Christine A. Lunardini, Standing Firm: William Monroe Trotter’s
Meetings with Woodrow Wilson, 1913–1914, 64 J. NEGRO HIST. 244 (1979) (listing the
conversations President Wilson had with William Monroe Trotter on the Wilson Administration’s
“justifications”).
75. Weiss, supra note 69, at 65.
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Grandfathering in the subjects of a Wilsonian threshold rescission is
a necessary but insufficient safeguard for reliance interests. In the Wilson
example, African-American civil servants were nominally allowed to
keep their jobs.76 Nevertheless, they were subjected to an array of
measures, formal and informal, that made their position virtually
impossible to maintain.77 In today’s transgender exclusion context, the
Mattis memorandum’s grandfathering of certain current service members
will not prevent other exclusionary measures, ranging from transfers to
an atmosphere of indignities that recalls the treatment of AfricanAmerican civil servants in the Wilson Administration.78 In both cases, the
rescission itself is a strong signal that senior officials have no interest in
enforcing the rights of the orphaned group. That signal will empower
others within the institution to act on their most invidious instincts and
discourage members of the institution who seek to live up to both the
letter and spirit of the military’s “commitment.”
In other contexts, even if reliance interests are less acute, a threshold
rescission will impose severe direct and collateral impacts. In the census
context, shifts in questions can depress the count, shifting apportionment
of political representatives and skewing other metrics based on the count,
including those shaping government funding, business planning,
philanthropic giving, and scholarship.79 The rescission of benefits such
as DACA and TPS can affect individuals who have embarked on life
plans such as higher education or skilled employment; it can also affect
individuals or entities who have collaborated with the recipient on such
projects.80
Two other factors support a heightened standard of review for
rescissions: institutional competence and legislative acquiescence. First
consider institutional competence.81 In a venerable justification for
judicial deference, particularly in areas such as national security and
foreign affairs, courts assert that they lack access to information about the
questions at issue, while the political branches have many more resources

76. See id. at 64.
77. See id.
78. See Alan Okros & Denise Scott, Gender Identity in the Canadian Forces: A Review of
Possible Impacts on Operational Effectiveness, 41 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 243, 251–52 (2014)
(discussing “hostile unit climates” in the Canadian military and the lack of decisive response by
commanders).
79. See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 315 F. Supp. 3d 766, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
80. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 491 (9th Cir.
2018); Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
81. See Chesney, supra note 7, at 1374.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss6/3

18

Margulies: Rescinding Inclusion in the Administrative State: Adjudicating DA

2019]

RESCINDING INCLUSION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

1447

available to get the facts. Confronting this asymmetry in information,
courts are reluctant to second-guess the executive branch.82
In rescission cases, there is reason to relax concerns about institutional
competence. In such cases, an administration has already used its
factfinding capabilities to explore a problem, canvas alternatives, and
reach a decision. In the administrative state, few decisions are made
overnight. Rather, administrators often—particularly in the national
security arena—have to participate in an interagency process that
jettisons bad ideas and refines good ones.83 Moreover, because an agency
often embodies many schools of thought and also brokers the interests of
external stakeholders, an action that is actually announced and
implemented—even in part—reflects a critical mass of disparate actors.84
In addition, many actors and stakeholders have their own pet projects,
which compete with the action at issue. An action that becomes official
policy has to compete successfully for agency attention with many other
compelling alternative projects. Because of these obstacles, some strong
arguments have to favor a proposal that reaches the status of an
announced and implemented decision.
Consider in this regard the inclusive transgender policy announced in
2016 by Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter.85 That policy was supported
by a lengthy report from the Rand Corporation, a longtime consultant to
82. When Congress delegates power to an agency to decide an issue, that delegation
provides an additional basis for deference. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018);
see also Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of
Speech, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 455, 457 (2012) (explaining the Court’s willingness to defer to
Congress’s restrictions on material support to foreign terrorist groups, even when statute affected
content of speech).
83. See Robert F. Bauer, The National Security Lawyer, In Crisis: When the “Best View”
of the Law May Not Be the Best View, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 239–40 (2018) (discussing
issue of the process regarding the provision of legal advice to the executive branch); see also Mary
DeRosa, National Security Lawyering: The Best View of the Law as a Regulative Ideal, 31 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 277, 291–92 (2018) (discussing “Lawyers Group[s]” that customarily met on an
interagency basis to discuss national security issues); Christopher Fonzone & Dana Remus, What
About When the Best View Is the Best View?, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 305, 315–18 (2018)
(discussing elaborate structures for dialogue and accountability within the executive branch);
Ingber, supra note 37; see also Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 2187, 2206–08 (2018) (discussing formal and informal protocols and procedures within
executive branch). See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012) (discussing the actions taken by the executive branch after 9/11).
84. See Ingber, supra note 37, at 143; Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers:
Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2417 (2006); Rao,
supra note 37, at 275; Mila Sohoni, The Administrative Constitution in Exile, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 923, 939–40 (2016); cf. Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-ofPowers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 408 (2016) (suggesting cycles in judicial willingness
to rely on the executive branch’s internal checks).
85. See Press Release, Dep’t of Def., supra note 66.
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the government on a broad spectrum of issues, including many former
government officials.86 Secretary Carter’s decision to relax the longtime
ban on transgender personnel’s accession to or retention in the military
also had to win approval from the various services and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. To be sure, this is not a formal requirement in the U.S.
Department of Defense (the DoD), given the constitutional imperative of
civilian control.87 Some dissent is certainly possible, and was indeed
actually present in the transgender inclusion context.88 Nevertheless, as a
practical matter, promulgating a measure over the assiduous opposition
of a majority of senior general officers would be difficult, especially
given the need for the military to implement an inclusive directive in
addition to the prospect of hostile senior officers reaching out to allies in
Congress and the media.89 Such opposition does not occur frequently and
is fraught with peril for its participants,90 but the prospect of such
opposition will often stymie proposals that lack a coherent rationale,
compelling evidence, and an elevated spot in senior political appointees’
priorities. A court reviewing a rescission of that agency measure has some
degree of confidence that the measure slated for rescission was at least
not outlandish, rife with unintended consequences, or wholly lacking in
political or bureaucratic support.91
86. See generally AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., RAND CORP., ASSESSING THE
IMPLICATIONS OF ALLOWING TRANSGENDER PERSONNEL TO SERVE OPENLY (2016),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1530.html [https://perma.cc/4YJ7-Z2WA]
(assessing the U.S. Department of Defense’s policy regarding transgender persons serving in the
military while undergoing transition-related treatment).
87. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers, 90
TEX. L. REV. 797, 801 (2012) (analyzing inherent problems with civilian controls over the
military).
88. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY SERVICE BY
TRANSGENDER PERSONS 44 (2018) (citing views of senior general officers approving the rollback
of Secretary Carter’s policy, supporting the inference that at least some senior generals had
disagreed with Secretary Carter’s change).
89. See Pearlstein, supra note 87, at 799–800 (discussing the pervasive involvement of the
military in defense policy formation and the political interactions of some senior military leaders).
90. Id. at 799 n.7 (discussing the firing of General Stanley McChrystal for publicly
disagreeing with official policy and casting aspersions on senior civilian officials).
91. Of course, such characterizations may also be true of rescissions. Cf. Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2404 (2018) (crediting the “worldwide review” with giving rise to the third
iteration of President Trump’s travel ban). However, decisions in the Trump Administration often
do not receive such vetting, at least when they are of personal interest to President Trump. See,
e.g., James Goldgeier & Elizabeth N. Saunders, The Unconstrained Presidency: Checks and
Balances Eroded Long Before Trump, FOREIGN AFF. (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.foreign
affairs.com/articles/2018-08-13/unconstrained-presidency?utm_campaign=reg_conf_email&
utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fa_registration [https://perma.cc/BV7L-LL6B] (“In the
age of Donald Trump, it often feels as though one individual has the power to chart the United
States’ course in the world all by himself.”). In these situations, senior advisors are often relegated
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Similarly, a policy already in place often has backing in Congress.
Admittedly, that backing may not be sufficient to result in an express
codification of the policy. Moreover, some legislators may oppose the
policy and do so vocally. However, many policies so enacted will have
firm bipartisan support.92 That increases the likelihood that such policies
will eventually take their place in Justice Robert Jackson’s familiar
typology as measures taken against a backdrop of congressional silence.93
In the short term, Congress’s response may not move the Youngstown
needle sufficiently to establish the prior policy’s lawfulness. However,
the absence of clear, consistent, and substantial congressional opposition
to an announced policy does at least provide some indicia that the policy
has wide support.
C. Threshold Rescission and the Importance of Means–Ends Scrutiny
Because of these factors, a threshold rescission should be subject to
intermediate scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, courts will determine
if a given measure is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest.”94 This test of fit between means and ends will
ensure that adequate deliberation supports threshold rescissions.
Requiring a fit between ends and means encourages deliberation and
guards against the short-term thinking that distressed the Framers.95 The
Framers were well-acquainted with the thought of Aristotle and other
classical theorists96 who regarded means–ends fit as integral to practical
judgment.97 As Alexander Hamilton observed, courts using practical
to triage and improvisation, stopping some highly imprudent moves and delaying others, while of
necessity permitting the implementation of some decisions that a more comprehensive vetting
process would catch. See Peter Margulies, Legal Dilemmas Facing White House Counsel in the
Trump Administration: The Costs of Public Disclosure of FISA Requests, 87 FORDHAM L. REV.
1913, 1929–31 (2019). In any case, under the model proposed in this Article, it seems reasonable
to believe that the proof is in the pudding: If a threshold rescission passes means–ends scrutiny, a
court should uphold it. If not, a court should restore the status quo prior to the rescission.
92. See Johnson, supra note 33, at 368 (discussing DACA’s bipartisan congressional
backing).
93. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
94. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (quoting McCullen v.
Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014)).
95. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (suggesting that judicial review
could temper influence of short-term “ill humors” on the political branches).
96. Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 203 (Penguin Books 1990) (1977) (noting the
Framers’ affinity for classical thought).
97. See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 152 (Martin Ostwald trans., The Bobbs-Merrill
Co., Inc. 1962) (“[T]he capacity of deliberating well about what is good and advantageous for
oneself is . . . typical of . . . practical wisdom . . . . This is shown by the fact that we speak of men
as having practical wisdom in a particular respect . . . when they calculate well with respect to
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judgment to assess constitutionality also yield vital ex ante benefits for
political officials, prodding them to tailor proposed actions to forestall
judicial invalidation.98
As an example of means–ends scrutiny that nominally only required
a “rational relationship” between means and ends but was in fact more
robust, consider City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.99 In
Cleburne, the Supreme Court struck down a local ordinance that
mandated that operators of a proposed group home for persons with
mental retardation receive a special permit.100 The Court discerned a lack
of means–ends fit in the ordinance because the town’s method for
fulfilling its goals ignored a great deal of activity that appeared
inconsistent with those goals. For example, the town justified requiring a
special permit by citing increased traffic and congestion.101 However, the
ordinance did not require a special permit requirement for other uses,
including fraternity houses, dormitories, and hospitals.102 This gap in the
special permit scheme showed that the town had not tailored means to
goals.
The Court has also employed robust means–ends scrutiny in the
context of citizenship law, closer to the national security and foreign
relations focus of this Article. In Sessions v. Morales-Santana,103 the
Court struck down a provision that favored mothers over fathers
regarding citizenship acquired at birth by a child born out of wedlock
some worthwhile end . . . .”); see also Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty: Judicial
Review of Immigration Law in the Trump Administration, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2018)
(discussing the Framers’ view of means–ends scrutiny and applying that approach to immigration
law).
98. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the prospect of judicial
review will encourage political actors to “qualify”—i.e., limit—their efforts to enact unjust
measures).
99. 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see Peter Margulies, The Travel Ban Decision, Administrative
Law, and Judicial Method: Taking Statutory Context Seriously, 33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 159, 178–
79 (discussing flaws in the Supreme Court’s use of Cleburne in Trump v. Hawaii to justify
upholding President Trump’s travel ban). Katie Eyer has written extensively on the complexities
and contradictions of the Court’s tiered system of review, under which nominally minimal review
can sometimes be actually robust, as in Cleburne, and lack of proof of intent can stall heightened
scrutiny. See generally, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, Animus Trouble, 48 STETSON L. REV. 215 (2019)
(arguing that progressives ought to be concerned about scholarly efforts to systematize the animus
doctrine).
100. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448–50 (1985)).
101. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
102. Id.
103. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017); cf. Kristin A. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family in
Morales-Santana, 131 HARV. L. REV. 170, 204–06 (2017) (arguing that the decision could set the
stage for rethinking judicial deference on immigration); Margulies, supra note 97, at 19–21
(analyzing Morales-Santana).
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abroad to a U.S. and foreign national.104 According to Justice Ruth
Ginsburg, who wrote for the Court, the provision’s lack of means–ends
fit was fatal.105 If Congress wished to ensure that a child born abroad was
“American in character” and thus merited citizenship,106 requiring
prolonged U.S. presence by the parent would show the parent’s
investment in the child’s American identity.107 Nevertheless, mandating
prolonged U.S. presence for a U.S. citizen father but not a U.S. citizen
mother “scarcely serve[s] the posited end.”108 In the absence of means–
ends fit, the Court struck down the acquired citizenship provision.109
However, in Trump v. Hawaii, the Court’s means–ends review was
far more deferential.110 In an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, the
Court upheld President Trump’s travel ban on certain majority-Muslim
countries.111 Illustrating its lack of means–ends fit, the ban covered a
range of individuals, including young children, whose entry into the
United States could not possibly endanger the national security of the
United States.112 Moreover, the ban cited the need to ensure appropriate
identity management steps by the countries that the ban covered, even
though some of those countries had strong track records in this area and
over one hundred countries with poor records were not covered by the
ban.113
104. See Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1682, 1698, 1700–01.
105. Id. at 1690 (“The defender of legislation that differentiates on the basis of gender must
show ‘at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and
that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524
(1996))).
106. Id. at 1692 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 6172 before the H. Comm. on Immigration and
Naturalization, 76th Cong. 431, 426–27 (1939)). See generally Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate
Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123
YALE L.J. 2134 (2014) (discussing the constitutionality of immigration statutes governing the
citizenship status of children born to American parents outside the United States that discriminate
between mother and father).
107. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1692 (rooting presence requirements in reasonable
congressional desire to ensure that a U.S. citizen parent could “counteract the influence of the
alien parent”); id. at 1695 (assuming that Congress wished to “ensur[e] a connection between the
foreign-born nonmarital child and the United States”).
108. Id. at 1695.
109. Id. at 1701.
110. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018).
111. Id. at 2423. The ban also extended to North Korea, which does not let its nationals leave
its own territory, and Venezuela—the latter restriction dealing only with members of the Maduro
regime and their family members and associates. See id. at 2405–06.
112. See id. at 2445 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 2404 (majority opinion); cf. Margulies, supra note 97, at 63–65 (discussing
the travel ban proclamation’s weak links between the ban and interests such as identity
management); Margulies, supra note 99, at 18 (analyzing the decision’s loose conception of
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The approach this Article takes requires a more robust brand of
means–ends scrutiny than the Court employed in the travel ban case.
Within that framework, an agency can argue that the rescission serves
administrative constitutionalism by fulfilling the government’s
responsibility, preserving the separation of powers, or protecting other
groups’ rights. However, a reviewing court should carefully scrutinize
such claims.
II. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S NEW RESTRICTIONS ON
TRANSGENDER MILITARY SERVICE: OF FALSE STARTS AND
GRANDFATHERED ORPHANS
The Trump Administration’s restrictions on transgender military
service roll back an expansion of transgender access and retention set in
motion under the Obama Administration. In grandfathering in certain
transgender service members, the new restrictions actually incorporate
some of the same elements proposed in this Article. Moreover, courts
assessing the new restrictions will need to acknowledge the deference that
military judgments have traditionally received.114 Nevertheless, as
Section II.A shows, some of the new restrictions fail to comply with the
Constitution.
A. Secretary Carter’s Constitutionalist Vision
Secretary Carter’s inclusive policy incorporated both a vision of the
Constitution and a path to implementing transgender inclusion that
provided sound guidance to commanders.115 Justifying the policy,
Secretary Carter stated the commitment to inclusion in terms of military
effectiveness. As Secretary Carter asserted, the U.S. military needs “all
available talent in order to remain the finest fighting force the world has
ever known.”116 The military’s “mission . . . to defend this country”
requires taking down “barriers unrelated to a person’s qualification to
means–ends fit); David Bier, Travel Ban Is Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective Criteria,
CATO INST. (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/travel-ban-based-executive-whim-notobjective-criteria [https://perma.cc/5PZC-HL8V] (describing the decision’s means–ends fit).
114. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (1981); Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 917 F.3d
694, 719–20 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Williams, J., concurring) (explaining the rationale for judicial
deference).
115. Secretary Carter’s initiative called for phasing in the new rules on the accession of
transgender individuals to the military. See Press Release, Dep’t of Def., supra note 66. These
rules were supposed to take effect in 2017. See id. President Trump first delayed implementation
of the new rules and then rescinded them after issuance of the 2018 Defense Report and Secretary
Mattis’s recommendations. See Memorandum from Donald J. Trump, supra note 2.
116. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., TRANSGENDER SERVICE IN THE U.S. MILITARY: AN
IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK 10 (2016) (emphasis added).
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serve.”117 The nod to equality here affirmed that inclusion is a
fundamental value in the U.S. constitutional system; the military, as an
integral part of that system, benefits from sharing those values. Indeed,
in certain contexts, including racial integration, the military has been a
leader, sending signals that the rest of society has followed.118
1. Transgender Personnel Currently Serve in the Military
Under Secretary Carter’s initiative, responsibility and inclusion were
not merely abstractions—they were pragmatic. As the Department of
Defense Handbook noted, “[t]here are transgender Service members in
uniform today.”119 In other words, even if Secretary Carter had done
nothing to ease restrictions on transgender accession and retention, the
military would still confront challenges regarding the integration of
transgender persons.
In addressing those challenges, Secretary Carter understood that
prejudice against transgender persons is dynamic, not static. As the
military has discovered with its easing or elimination of restrictions based
on race, gender, and sexual orientation, attitudes can broaden “over
time.”120 A pragmatic understanding of human institutions acknowledges
the inevitability of change.
2. Responsibility and Guidance in the Carter Policy
Secretary Carter’s policy was also mindful of both the government’s
responsibilities and the rights of others. Under Carter’s policy, rules for
accession maintained substantial limits on prospective transgender
service members. Since the rules required that a new recruit be stable and
without significant clinical distress for eighteen months,121 Carter’s
criteria screened out a substantial cohort of transgender persons who had
experienced gender dysphoria within that period. Under the American
Psychiatric Association’s compendium of clinical wisdom, the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5), “clinically significant
distress” is a key symptom of gender dysphoria, which refers to a
“marked incongruence” between expressed and assigned gender.122
117. Id. at 7.
118. See AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at 44; Knowles, supra note 63;
Joseph Landau, Presidential Constitutionalism and Civil Rights, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1719,
1762 (2014) (noting the Obama Administration’s successful effort to repeal the military’s “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy limiting gay and lesbian service).
119. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 116 (emphasis added).
120. AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at 44.
121. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 116, at 40.
122. Marty Lederman, Untangling the Issues in the “Transgender in the Military”
Litigation, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 7, 2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
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Screening out prospective recruits who had exhibited significant distress
within eighteen months of accession barred candidates whose conflicts
between experienced and assigned gender could have impaired their
ability to help accomplish the military’s mission.
The Carter approach also entailed detailed guidance for commanders.
This attention to detail began with the Rand report that provided the initial
support for Carter’s initiative. While the 2018 Department of Defense
Report (the 2018 Report) partially rolling back Carter’s policy faulted
Rand for a misleadingly rosy view of the literature on other militaries’
experience,123 the Rand report’s authors actually acknowledged shortfalls
in the practice of America’s allies, including Canada.124 The Department
of Defense Handbook implementing Carter’s changes did not stint on
details. It included a cornucopia of hypotheticals that provided sensible
guidance to commanders, particularly on managing accommodations for
transgender persons that might touch on countervailing rights such as the
privacy and dignity of non-transgender service members.125
3. Taking Statistics Seriously: Low Base Rates for
Transgender Personnel
Lastly, the Carter policy relied on estimated low base rates for
transgender recruits to discount both monetary costs and disruption in
deployments that the military would experience because of transgender
exclusion.126 Rand used estimates of the incidence of transgender status
in the military that pegged that number as higher than it would be in the
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-5) (5th ed. 2013)),
https://www.justsecurity.org/62128/untangling-issues-transgender-military-litigation/ [https://
perma.cc/8FEC-5DMJ]. Marty Lederman has authored an exceptionally insightful and
comprehensive study of differences and overlaps between the Carter and Mattis policies that
explains the core treatment and diagnostic concepts. See id.
123. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 88, at 40.
124. See AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at 62–63 (noting that a Canadian
study documented persistence of harassment of transgender service members); id. at 63 (noting
that Canada’s initial policy was “too vague and lacked sufficient details” and reporting that the
newly revised Canadian policy had garnered positive responses).
125. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 116, at 63 (providing guidance on
administering a swim test involving fully transitioned male service member who retained female
secondary sexual characteristics, including the sensible suggestion that everyone wear a shirt). In
addressing shower protocol, the Department of Defense Handbook recommended common-sense
steps such as installing shower curtains and placing towel and clothing hooks within individual
stalls as well as staggering shower times. Id. at 60–61.
126. AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at 34–35. A base rate is the overall
percentage that a particular phenomenon comprises in a particular population. See Drew Boyd,
Innovation and the Base Rate, PSYCHOL. TODAY (July 11, 2013), https://www.psychology
today.com/us/blog/inside-the-box/201307/innovation-and-the-base-rate [https://perma.cc/8TAP6RPZ].
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general population.127 Based on that extreme figure—which is still low
overall—Rand estimated that the net increased cost of transition-related
health care for the entire U.S. military would be a maximum of $8.4
million.128
That figure translates into an infinitesimal increase in the military’s
overall health care costs. Estimating the relative increase in health care
costs for a large entity like the U.S. military also requires estimating the
total health care costs of that entity. Based on 2015 estimates, the U.S.
military spends $6.2 billion on health care annually, including expenses
related to mental health, pregnancy of service members and their
dependents, and a host of other long- and short-term conditions.129 Rand’s
worst-case projection of transition-related health costs—$8.4 million—
would represent a paltry 0.13% of the military’s total health care
budget.130 Put another way, if an individual paid a health insurance
premium of $1,000, the added coverage of transition-related care would
cost that subscriber an additional $1.30.
The same focus on base rates illustrates the minimal effect an
inclusive transgender policy would have on deployment. Of course, the
ability to deploy readily is a central attribute for an effective military. A
key metric for measuring disruption in employment is the labor year: the
time spent on work by an employee annually. As a large entity, the U.S.
military has a very high total for aggregate labor years: 1.2 million.131 As
of 2015, the active duty component of the U.S. Army alone already had
50,000 soldiers who were not deployable due to medical, legal, and
administrative factors.132 That total amounted to 14% of the active duty
Army, and 5,300 labor years.133 In other words, approximately one out of
seven active duty Army personnel was unavailable to deploy for all or a
significant part of the preceding year. In contrast, even extreme estimates
of labor years lost because of transition-related medical treatment
amounted to no more than a total of forty-three, and could be as few as
eight.134 In a small number of “unique military occupation[s],” such as a
fighter pilot that might involve “frequent, unpredicted mobilizations,” a
high incidence of serious medical procedures would in fact disrupt
127. AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at 35 (using the higher figure because
the military is disproportionately male and male-to-female transition is more common in the
general population).
128. Id. at 36.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 42.
132. Id. at 46.
133. Id. at 46–47.
134. Id. at 42 (noting this was in part because only a small number of transgender service
members actually undergo medical procedures that would affect deployability).
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deployment.135 If everyone in an aviation unit required a transfer, that
would obviously affect combat readiness. But the low incidence of
transgender personnel reduces this risk to virtually zero.
The high incidence of nondeployability in the U.S. military
independent of transition treatment highlights a final facet of
responsibility alluded to earlier: transgender individuals already serve in
the military and have done so for a long time. However, under the
transgender ban they could not do so openly. As a corollary to this covert
existence, transgender service members were at greater risk for suicide
and mental illness.136 Barring treatment for transitions caused human
tragedies and increased costs for conditions caused by the absence of
treatment and acceptance. Secretary Carter acknowledged these human
and financial costs.
B. The Mattis Policy’s Constitutionalist Response
The 2018 Mattis policy’s administrative constitutionalist vision did
not adequately support its partial rescission of Carter’s policy. Because
the rescission is partial, not plenary, further unpacking of the 2018 policy
is useful. Several of the 2018 departures from the Carter policy fail the
test of means–ends fit, including the policy’s refusal to allow
accommodations in bunking, bathroom use, and showering for service
members who have received a diagnosis of gender dysphoria after the
effective date of the 2018 policy.137 However, the Mattis policy
appropriately grandfathered in current service members who have
already received a diagnosis of gender dysphoria in reliance on the Carter
policy, including those who had planned medical procedures.138
Moreover, the Mattis policy did not restrict accession and retention of
all transgender individuals because it grandfathered in certain medically
transitioning personnel and was open to individuals who identified with
a gender other than their assigned one but did not suffer from gender
dysphoria.139 In addition, one element of the Mattis policy’s change in
accession criteria—extending from eighteen to thirty-six months the time
that candidates with gender dysphoria must be stable prior to accession—
is a difference from the Carter policy in degree, but not in kind. For this
reason, this Article concludes that courts should disaggregate the
135. Id. at 43.
136. Id. at 9–10.
137. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 88, at 42.
138. See Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 917 F.3d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Wilkins, J., concurring)
(noting that the Mattis policy was not a total ban on transgender accession and retention and
detailing its differences from President Trump’s original tweet on this subject).
139. Id.; see also id. at 701 (agreeing that Mattis policy did not constitute a total transgender
ban); Lederman, supra note 122 (citing to the Shanahan decisions).
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components of the Mattis policy and separately review their respective
means–ends fit.
Before disaggregating those components, it is useful to more fully
discuss the Mattis policy’s reasoning, as articulated in the 2018 Report.
Regarding its refusal to allow accommodations in bunking, bathroom use,
and showering, the 2018 Report invoked the “reasonable expectations of
privacy” of non-transgender service members and the DoD’s
responsibility to ensure “good order and discipline.”140 The 2018 Report
stated that the Carter policy and the Rand report supporting that policy
unduly discounted the “conflicting interests” that an inclusive
transgender policy would set in motion, as well as the “significant effort
required of commanders” to address those issues.141 These effects would
impair unit cohesion, “degrad[ing] an otherwise highly functioning
team.”142 Moreover, the 2018 Report declared, the Rand report’s citation
to positive experiences with transgender inclusion in other militaries,
such as Canada’s, had failed to acknowledge the problems remaining in
those entities.143 Finally, the 2018 Report asserted that the Carter policy
failed to adequately address the “[d]isproportionate” medical costs of
inclusion and the increased risk of suicidal behavior.144
As a first step in addressing these concerns, the 2018 Report echoes
the Carter policy by imposing limits on accession for unstable candidates.
The Carter policy required a showing of eighteen months of stability prior
to accession, while the 2018 policy doubles that amount to thirty-six
months. In both cases, the stability criterion is designed to bar individuals
most likely to impose costs and present challenges to commanders. The
doubling of time in the Mattis policy is a difference in degree only.
Because the stability requirement will screen out many individuals, the
Carter and Mattis policies differ principally in how they handle the
residual cases.
1. The Mattis Policy’s Partial Rollback
The Mattis policy also does not restrict all transgender individuals
going forward. Outside of the grandfathered group, its principal impact
is on those with gender dysphoria and on persons seeking to join the
military who have already fully transitioned through medical treatment
or otherwise. The DSM-5 of the American Psychiatric Association
recognizes persons as transgender if they feel a need to express
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
risk).

See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 88, at 36.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41 (discussing medical costs) (emphasis omitted); see id. at 21 (discussing suicide
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themselves in a gender other than their assigned gender, even if that
feeling does not rise to the level of gender dysphoria.145 The 2018 policy
would allow persons with that need to serve, as long as they could comply
with the standards imposed on their assigned gender.146 Because the 2018
policy does not bar accession or retention of all transgender individuals,
under the traditional equal protection approach courts would employ only
rational basis review, which the policy could most likely pass. However,
the more rigorous review proposed in this Article would lead to a
different result, at least for certain aspects of the Mattis policy.
2. The Mattis Policy and Means–Ends Fit
Significant parts of the Mattis policy lack means–ends fit. These
include the bar on retention of individuals who in the future require either
transition-related medical services or accommodations in bunking,
bathroom use, and showering. Another vulnerable component is the bar
on accession of individuals who have already completed a medical
transition. These contexts provide the clearest contrasts to the Carter
policy.
Lack of means–ends fit is a problem for the 2018 Mattis Policy’s bar
on retention of individuals requiring future medical procedures. The 2018
Report cites current data on the costs of such procedures to support its
recommended changes to the Carter policy.147 While the data included in
the 2018 Report indicates a cost increase due to inclusion, that data
reveals less than meets the eye. The “headline” in the 2018 data is a 300%
increase in “medical costs” for service members with gender
dysphoria.148 But the 2018 Report fails to provide crucial context, such
as countervailing costs, low base rates for transgender individuals in the
military, low absolute costs, and very low relative costs of transgender
medical treatment, as compared with the military’s overall medical
expenditures.149
An assessment of countervailing costs highlights a point that the
Carter policy takes as a fundamental premise but the Mattis policy
downplays: transgender people—even apart from the group wisely
grandfathered in under the new policy—are already in our military and
145. See Lederman, supra note 122 (outlining the American Psychiatric Association’s
recognition of transgender persons’ need to express themselves in a gender other than their
assigned gender at birth).
146. See Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 917 F.3d 694, 699–700 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Wilkins, J.,
concurring).
147. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 88, at 41. Waivers are also possible, but the military will
presumably be sparing in granting them. See id. at 42.
148. Id. at 41.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 126–130.
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will be there in the future, experiencing needs that the military will have
to address, one way or another. The 2018 Report’s 300% quote fails to
specifically address the countervailing costs of both medical and nonmedical services delivered to persons already in the military who are
transgender but have not yet acknowledged this publicly. Those
individuals also seek treatment for a range of conditions, including
depression, suicide attempts and ideation, and medical issues that serve
as proxies for transgender treatments.150 There is no indication that the
2018 Report factored in these countervailing costs avoided by inclusion.
Indeed, the 2018 Report’s approach to the issue of suicide among
transgender individuals demonstrates its failure to address the problems
of transgender individuals who already serve. The Rand report
demonstrates that suicide is a heightened risk for individuals who do not
serve openly.151 Studies show that the absence of acceptance is a prime
contributor to suicide in this cohort.152 Restrictive policies in the military
are another link in that chain. Suicide among transgender individuals is
not a new problem ushered in by inclusion; it is an old problem that
restrictive policies exacerbate. The Carter policy acknowledged this
concern; the 2018 Report unduly discounted it.
The 2018 Report’s failure to fully address the problems of alreadyserving transgender personnel also undermines the recommended bar on
retention of individuals who require accommodations in bunking,
bathroom use, and showering. Here, too, the 2018 Report fails to
acknowledge that base rates for such issues will be quite low, and that
measures such as the thirty-six-month stability requirement for accession
will drive these rates down even further. A complete report would have
directly compared these low levels of disruption with the higher levels of
treatment for depression and other conditions that covert transgender
personnel already require, which also disrupt unit cohesion and combat
readiness. In addition, the 2018 Report should have fully acknowledged
the very specific guidance on privacy that Secretary Carter provided in
the Department of Defense Handbook, including recommendations on
subdividing showers and staggering shower times.153 While the 2018
Report warns of significant effort expended by commanders, the
150. See AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at 9–10, 33–34 (discussing the
range of costs that transgender inclusion would markedly reduce and providing the example of an
individual who sought and received breast reduction due to back pain as a proxy for treatment
attributed to gender transition).
151. Id. at 9–10.
152. See Raymond P. Tucker et al., Current and Military-Specific Gender Minority Stress
Factors and Their Relationship with Suicide Ideation in Transgender Veterans, 49 SUICIDE &
LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 155, 155–56 (2019).
153. See supra notes 137–140 and accompanying text.
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straightforward advice in the Department of Defense Handbook answers
most reasonable questions.154
For the same reasons, the 2018 Mattis policy’s bar on accession of
already-transitioned candidates fails intermediate scrutiny. This policy
may serve the military’s legitimate “interest in uniformity.”155 In this
sense, the 2018 policy echoes earlier case law deferring to military
judgments about qualifications and apparel.156 However, given the
importance of contributions that transitioned transgender individuals can
make and the costs of the old ban, those judgments should not overcome
the force of Secretary Carter’s shift to a new paradigm.
In sum, disaggregation is a useful exercise for evaluating the 2018
Mattis policy. The thirty-six-month stability requirement prior to
accession survives intermediate scrutiny. The ban on accession of
completely transitioned candidates fails, as do the retention bars for those
service members who require future accommodations or medical
treatment. While the 2018 policy helpfully grandfathers in service
members who have already planned medical treatments and allows the
accession and retention of persons without gender dysphoria, the
remaining Mattis restrictions lack means–ends fit. They may be sufficient
under the relaxed standard that customarily applies in the absence of
suspect or quasi-suspect classifications. However, under the approach
taken here, those restrictions fail.
154. The 2018 Report’s criticism of Carter’s policy on accommodations relied on isolated
cases and misinterpretation of earlier guidance. The authors of the 2018 Report cited one case in
which female members of a unit had complained about a showering accommodation for a
transgender service member, who in turn had filed a complaint stating that the commander had
not respected the transgender service member’s rights under the new policy. See U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF., supra note 88, at 37. Such bumps in the road are common for implementation of any new
paradigm. While some resistance to change is a given in the short term, resistance is not a static
phenomenon; it can change over time. As Secretary Carter’s Department of Defense Handbook
reflected, a clear response from commanders would greatly ease this process, as it did for the other
changes that the military has managed in the last seventy-five years, including integration based
on race, gender, and sexual orientation. See AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at
44.
The 2018 Report also incorrectly asserted that the Rand report failed to note that foreign
militaries such as Canada’s did not provide sufficient guidance. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra
note 88, at 40–41. In fact, the Rand report expressly noted this problem. See AGNES GEREBEN
SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at 54 (noting that Canada’s initial policy “d[id] not . . . provide
guidance” on balancing transgender service members’ need for accommodation and others’
privacy rights). Carter’s guidance on accommodations was a response to the initial problems that
Canada’s experience revealed. The 2018 Report’s misinterpretation of earlier documents is one
reason to accord it less deference than courts have traditionally employed.
155. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 88, at 38.
156. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507–10 (1986) (upholding military
regulations requiring uniformity in headgear that, inter alia, barred wearing of a yarmulke by an
observant Jew who served as a clinical psychologist on Air Force base).
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III. THE CENSUS CITIZENSHIP QUESTION AS A THRESHOLD RESCISSION
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross’s attempt to include a citizenship
question on the 2020 census also counts as a threshold rescission. While
the Secretary of Commerce has broad discretion in questions surrounding
the census count,157 the selection of questions is nonetheless part of the
constitutional obligation of completing the census.158 The census
influences apportionment, which in turn affects the contours of political
representation. Here, the government could not show the means–ends fit
to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.159
A. Past Practice on Asking the Citizenship Question
In contrast with the military transgender policy, the policy that
Secretary Ross rescinded did not start with President Obama. The Census
Bureau last posed a citizenship question on the “short-form” census—the
survey virtually everyone receives—in 1950.160 The premise for this
longtime practice of omitting the short-form census citizenship question
warrants further explanation.
An accurate count includes the “whole number of persons.”161 The
Department of Justice (DOJ) has consistently advised the Census Bureau
that foreign nationals who are residents of the United States “must be
included,” regardless of their immigration status.162 Indeed, as DOJ
attorney—now a noted constitutional law professor—David A. Strauss
advised Congress in 1980, “[t]he drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment,”
which updated the census clause to reflect the freeing of enslaved people,
“considered, and deliberately rejected, proposals that the apportionment
of Representatives be based on the number of legal voters, or on the
number of citizens. Historically, resident aliens of all varieties have been

157. Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 2 (1996) (per curiam).
158. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
159. The challenges to Secretary Ross’s decision included both constitutional and APA
claims. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2019). While the Court
relied solely on the APA in upholding an injunction against the short-form census citizenship
question, id. at 2574–76, this Article argues that the Court’s APA analysis paralleled the
constitutional arguments made in this section. See infra notes 204–08 and accompanying text.
160. Tamara Keith, Fact Check: Has Citizenship Been a Standard Census Question? NPR
(Mar. 27, 2018, 8:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/27/597436512/fact-check-hascitizenship-been-a-standard-census-question [https://perma.cc/PNE6-MTHP].
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
162. See Census Equity Act: Hearing on H.R. 2661 Before the Subcomm. on Census &
Population of the H. Comm. on Post Office & Civil Serv., 101st Cong. 43 (1989) (testimony of C.
Louis Kinkannon, Deputy Dir., U.S. Census Bureau) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2661].
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included in the population figures on which the allocation of
Representatives was based.”163
An inaccurate count of the “whole number of persons” would have
significant collateral impacts. Suppose that a given method undermined
“distributive accuracy”—a faithful comparative assessment of
population in different sub-federal government subdivisions.164 That
disparity could skew apportionment of seats in the House of
Representatives and votes in the Electoral College, as well as state
legislative seats.165 In addition, it could distort funding formulas used to
allocate government money. Mistakes could also affect the giving of
charitable foundations, the marketing strategies of corporations, and a
long list of other activities. Those impacts merit care in the selection of
questions that can affect participation rates.
From a historical perspective, census officials have not always viewed
a citizenship question as clashing with such concerns. As Secretary Ross
correctly observed, the government for well over a century asked a
question about citizenship.166 However, the government stopped asking
that question almost sixty years ago.167 Successive generations of census
officials have argued on a bipartisan basis that such an inquiry would chill
responses by undocumented noncitizens and others born abroad or related
to foreign nationals in the United States.168
In preparation for the 1980 census, officials were gravely concerned
about the prospect of “convincing undocumented immigrants that the
163. 1980 Census: Counting Illegal Aliens: Hearing on S. 2366 Before the Subcomm. on
Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, & Fed. Servs. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th
Cong. 96 (1980) (testimony of David A. Strauss). However, the Supreme Court has never decided
this issue.
164. Lyle Denniston, Does the Census Actually Count Everyone and Should It?, NAT’L
CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (Mar. 12, 2019), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/does-the-censusactually-count-everyone-and-should-it [https://perma.cc/T8G9-L5LA].
165. Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1996) (per curiam). The Supreme
Court has held that “distributive accuracy” is vital to the census’s role in apportionment. Id. at 20.
In other words, a count featuring an overall error in estimating the United States population may
not undermine the census’s purpose if that count correctly states the population ratios between
different states. That latter comparative figure drives the apportionment process. See generally
Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom to Count, and
Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 755 (2011) (discussing principles applied by courts
in census cases).
166. See Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, supra note 3, at 2; see also Dep’t of Commerce
v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2566–67 (2019) (discussing history of asking demographic
questions on short-form census).
167. See Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, supra note 3, at 2.
168. See Hearing on H.R. 2661, supra note 162, at 43–44 (observing that a citizenship
question could “seriously jeopardize the accuracy of the census” because, due to concerns about
answers assisting immigration enforcement, “immigrants may either avoid the census altogether
or deliberately misreport themselves as legal residents”).
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census results would not be given to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service officials for use in deportation proceedings.”169 This concern
crystallized when a group favoring tougher immigration enforcement and
limits on immigration, the Federation for American Immigration Reform
(FAIR), sued the Secretary of Commerce over the failure to ask a
citizenship question.170 Finding for the Commerce Secretary, a threejudge district court panel observed that, according to census officials, a
citizenship question would “inevitably jeopardize the overall accuracy of
the population count” through a chilling effect on segments of the
population anxious about “information being used against them” in
immigration enforcement.171
In 1980 and in subsequent years, officials from the census bureau and
other departments testified in Congress that a citizenship question would
cause undocumented people—perhaps joined by naturalized citizens or
those with undocumented or lawful resident relatives—to
“misunderstand or mistrust the census and fail or refuse to respond.”172
Focus groups assembled after Secretary Ross’s decision to include the
citizenship question provided strong evidence of mistrust expressed by
minorities with immigrant ties, including persons of Hispanic, Chinese,
Middle Eastern, North African, and Vietnamese heritage.173 Diminished
response from these groups would then lead to losses in electoral
representation and other benefits for states and cities with substantial
proportions of undocumented and foreign-born individuals.
B. The Citizenship Question and Means–Ends Fit
While the strong discretionary component in determining appropriate
census questions usually calls for a less exacting standard of review,174
under the approach taken in this Article, the departure from decades of
practice and the collateral impacts just described warranted a closer look
at the basis of Secretary Ross’s decision.175 To do that, one must first
consider the administrative constitutionalist rationale behind asking the
citizenship question.
169. See MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 234 (2d ed.
2015).
170. Fed’n for Am. Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 565 (D.D.C. 1980).
171. Id.
172. See Hearing on H.R. 2661, supra note 162, at 53–54.
173. Michael Wines, Inside the Trump Administration’s Fight to Add a Citizenship Question
to the Census, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/04/us/wilbur-rosscommerce-secretary.html [https://perma.cc/Y4FF-ZNS2].
174. Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1996) (per curiam).
175. Historical experience has been important in judicial review of census decisions. Id. at
21; see also Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 803–06 (1992) (discussing the relevance of
historical practice).
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Secretary Ross’s rationale for the change also centered on rights; for
Secretary Ross, the putative touchstone was enforcement of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).176 In terms of intermediate scrutiny, ensuring
effective VRA enforcement is clearly a significant objective. As
Secretary Ross explained, VRA enforcement requires an accurate
determination of the citizenship voting age population (CVAP) in each
state, since only citizens can vote in federal elections.177 In the abstract,
posing a citizenship question on the short-form census is a reasonable
way to obtain this information, consistent with the Secretary of
Commerce’s historic discretion.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts,
upheld the district court's injunction against the citizenship question and
its remand to the Commerce Department. The Chief Justice took a
deferential substantive view of Secretary Ross’s determination that
asking a citizenship on the short-form census was a reasonable way to
obtain citizenship information, but coupled that with a process-based
finding that the Commerce Department’s VRA rationale was
“contrived.”178 Chief Justice Roberts noted that whether to add a
citizenship question to the census was an “important” decision that
required “genuine justifications.”179 In this respect, the Chief Justice
found the Commerce Department's decision lacking.
Attacking the Commerce Department’s substantive reasoning, the
challengers to Secretary Ross’s decision to add a citizenship question to
the short-form census had argued that there are more accurate
alternatives to the short-form census to accomplish the goal of obtaining
citizenship data. Consider readily available administrative records.
Secretary Ross’s own memo announcing the inclusion of the citizenship
question conceded that “administrative records could be more accurate
than self-responses” on the short form.180 Self-reporting is simply not a
good way to obtain accurate citizenship information. Secretary Ross
conceded that, in responding to other Census Bureau requests for
information, approximately one-third of noncitizen respondents
incorrectly report that they are U.S. citizens.181 Under the circumstances,
adding a citizenship question to the short-form census seems like
throwing good money after bad.
176. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101, 10301–
14, 10501–08, 10701–02 (2012)); see also Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, supra note 3, at 1.
177. Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, supra note 3, at 1.
178. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 4; see also New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 535
(S.D.N.Y. 2019).
181. See Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, supra note 3, at 4.
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Moreover, asking the citizenship question on the short-form census
would have the adverse effect of “seriously jeopardiz[ing] the
[distributive] accuracy of the census.”182 As noted above, experts agree
that posing the question would deter participation by undocumented
persons. It would thus skew the count against urban areas that are
population centers for this cohort.183
Chief Justice Roberts rejected each of these concerns and ruled out
rigorous means–ends scrutiny of the Commerce Department’s decisions
about what demographic information to seek on the short-form census.184
As Chief Justice Roberts put it, both using administrative records and
asking about citizenship on the short-form census involved “tradeoffs
between accuracy and completeness.”185 For Chief Justice Roberts,
assessing the merits of these tradeoffs was a job for the Secretary of
Commerce, not the courts.186 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, disagreed on the question of substantive
deference, asserting that the Commerce Department’s decision to add a
citizenship question triggered issues of accuracy and completeness that
rendered the decision arbitrary and capricious under the APA.187
But for Chief Justice Roberts, the process followed by Secretary Ross
in linking the short-form census citizenship question to VRA
enforcement nonetheless merited affirmance of the district court's
injunction against asking the citizenship question—a sentiment shared by
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Roberts initially
observed that the VRA rationale had “played an insignificant role in the
decisionmaking process.”188 Explaining this conclusion, Roberts stated
that, according to the record, Secretary Ross had reversed the order of
steps in agency decisions, by starting with a desired outcome and then
maneuvering to achieve this result. As Roberts observed, Secretary Ross
was “determined” to add a citizenship question “from the time he entered
office,” demanded that his staff “make it happen,” and—when that was
unavailing—collared “the Attorney General himself” to ask if the
Department of Justice (DOJ) would cite VRA enforcement in requesting
insertion of a citizenship question.189
All along the way, according to Chief Justice Roberts, the Commerce
Department’s process showed the “contrived” nature of its VRA
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Hearing on H.R. 2661, supra note 162, at 43.
Id. at 43–44.
Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2569.
Id.
Id. at 2571.
Id. at 2587–92 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 2574.
Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2574.
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rationale.190 Ross's initial attempts to induce other agencies to request
census-based citizenship data targeted the Department of Homeland
Security and DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review,
respectively, although neither agency has any role at all in VRA
enforcement.191 When—after Secretary Ross’s buttonholing of the
Attorney General—the DOJ Civil Rights Division requested insertion of
a citizenship question, its request was baldly instrumental, focusing on
promoting Secretary Ross’s desired outcome, not obtaining actual
citizenship data.192 Indeed, the December 2017 DOJ request parroted the
language and reasoning of Secretary Ross's staff and advisors.193 In its
indifference to alternative ways to obtain data needed for VRA
enforcement, the DOJ request diverged markedly from “typical” agency
requests for assistance.194
In isolation, each of these data points may have been insufficient to
prompt doubts about the Commerce Department’s good faith. Cabinet
secretaries and other senior officials carry their policy predilections into
office with them and work both with senior colleagues and subordinates
to refine the legal basis for a policy decision.195 However, viewed in
context, the Commerce Department’s process illustrated a “disconnect”
between its decision and the VRA rationale, indicating that the latter was
“contrived” rather than “genuine.”196
Chief Justice Roberts appeared to reject rigorous means–ends scrutiny
in the census case, instead opting for scrutiny of Secretary Ross’s process
in matching the VRA rationale with the decision to ask the citizenship
question. However, Chief Justice Roberts’ process-based approach
paralleled means-ends scrutiny.197 Roberts’ inquiry concerned whether
Secretary Ross had acted in “bad faith” in seeking to link the citizenship
question to VRA enforcement.198 A means–ends inquiry would have
190. Id. at 2575.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2575.
195. Id. at 2574–75; see also In re Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. 16, 17 (2018) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]here’s nothing unusual about a new cabinet
secretary coming to office inclined to favor a different policy direction, soliciting support from
other agencies to bolster his views, disagreeing with staff, or cutting through red tape.”) (granting
stay of district court’s order to take Secretary Ross’s deposition).
196. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2575–76.
197. Cf. Richard Fallon, Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV.
523, 545 (2016) (citing Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443 (1996)) (discussing how tests
used by courts serve as vehicles for revealing impermissible governmental intent).
198. Department of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2573–74.
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asked whether other alternative means were available to obtain
citizenship data for achieving this goal. While Roberts did not ask this
question directly in his opinion, he did note that the Census Bureau
professionals had asked DOJ whether alternative means would address
their concerns, and that DOJ had declined to explore other options besides
the citizenship question.199 DOJ officials’ indifference suggested that
their real focus was not VRA enforcement. Instead, it was nakedly
instrumental—providing cover for Secretary Ross’s attempt to insert the
citizenship question.
In this sense, Roberts’ approach in the census case harmonized with
means–ends scrutiny, which analyzes the relationship of means and ends
to smoke out pretextual motivation.200 Given Roberts’ ferreting out of
pretext through weighing the government’s process against its putative
rationale, the Chief Justice’s earlier discussion of deference to
government choices about accuracy and completeness seems like dicta.
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts’ willingness to look behind the
government’s putative rationale occurred in the context of a threshold
rescission: the government’s abrupt reversal of a concededly “important”
policy choice.201
IV. THE DACA AND TPS RESCISSIONS
Finally, this Article addresses two immigration issues concerning the
Trump Administration’s efforts to rescind DACA and TPS. Here, too,
agencies have a substantial measure of discretion. That is most evident
with DACA, which entails deferred action—a form of relief rooted in the
agency’s convenience and enforcement priorities.202 But TPS also
undeniably entails discretion; indeed, Congress has insulated particular
decisions about TPS from judicial review.203 That said, both are threshold
measures: each determines whether a recipient can legally live and work
in the United States. Rescinding each form of relief therefore should
trigger robust means–ends scrutiny. However, in both cases, that scrutiny
199. Id. at 2575.
200. See Fallon, Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, supra note 197.
201. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2575.
202. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012) (explaining the importance of
discretion in immigration enforcement); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S.
471, 484 (1999) (noting that immigration enforcement units exercise discretion not to commence
removal proceedings, which the Court termed “deferred action,” based on a range of factors,
including “humanitarian reasons or simply for [their] . . . own convenience”); Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (explaining why the Court held that most agency decisions not to
start regulatory enforcement proceedings were unreviewable under the APA); see also Ronald M.
Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 715–17
(1990) (discussing pragmatic considerations in Chaney).
203. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) (2012).
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focuses on the processes and modes of explanation that the agency has
used. While each rescission fails the test, further effort could reverse that
finding.
A. The Constitutionalist Origins of the DACA Program
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) justified DACA
initially as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion providing work
authorization and a renewable reprieve from removal to foreign nationals
who came to the United States as children and had no path to a legal
status.204 As the Supreme Court observed in Heckler v. Chaney,205 a
decision about whether to commence either a criminal prosecution or a
regulatory proceeding is a product of an agency’s “ordering of its
priorities.”206 In ranking its own priorities, an agency’s knowledge of its
own budget and personnel renders it “far better equipped” than the courts
to assess the appropriateness of bringing a particular enforcement
proceeding.207
That said, DACA—as well as the larger program for undocumented
parents, DAPA—also sprang from an administrative constitutionalist

204. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar et al., Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (June 15, 2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-whocame-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/9N42-EALH]; see also Margulies, supra note 22, at
177 (2014) (analyzing DACA and finding it legal but conceding this was a close question).
Compare Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 781, 856 (2013) (asserting that DACA went beyond the scope of delegation), with SHOBA
SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN
IMMIGRATION CASES 54–59 (2015) (arguing that the ambit of discretion under INA included largescale programs such as DACA). The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel relied on a
similar rationale in authorizing a larger program of immigration benefits, Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans (DAPA). See Memorandum from Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S. (Nov.
19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/file/179206/download [https://perma.cc/HK2B-RWQV]. The
Fifth Circuit subsequently ruled that DAPA exceeded Congress’s delegation to the President. See
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 180 (5th Cir. 2015); cf. Josh Blackman, The
Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 213,
284 (2015) (arguing that DAPA exceeded presidential power). The author of this Article served
as co-counsel for amici curiae in the Supreme Court phase of the Texas case, arguing that DAPA
exceeded the agency’s statutory authority. See Brief for Former Homeland Security, Justice, and
State Department Officials as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, United States v. Texas,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674).
205. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
206. Id. at 832.
207. Id.
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vision and revealed that concept’s normative tensions.208 DACA, with its
solicitude for undocumented persons who came to the United States as
children, echoed the notes of inclusion that the Supreme Court had first
articulated in Plyler v. Doe,209 which barred states from denying public
education to undocumented children. Finding that Texas’s exclusionary
legislation violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court, in an opinion
by Justice William Brennan, utilized a robust brand of means–ends
scrutiny.210 Citing the U.S. Attorney General’s acknowledgment that the
federal government could not possibly deport all undocumented children
within the foreseeable future, Justice Brennan found that Texas’s aim of
conserving resources was self-defeating.211 Texas’s policy would not
conserve resources in the long run for Texas or other jurisdictions, Justice
Brennan opined.212 Rather, Texas’s exclusion of undocumented children
would impose social costs—what economists call negative
externalities—by creating a cohort that lacked basic education and was
therefore less able to contribute to the country.213
Prior to his presidency, then-senator Barack Obama invoked a vision
closely resembling Plyler’s in addressing the predicament of
undocumented children.214 In his manifesto, The Audacity of Hope,
Obama warned against withholding from undocumented persons—
especially children—“the rights and opportunities that we take for
208. See generally Alina Das, Administrative Constitutionalism in Immigration Law, 98 B.U.
L. REV. 485 (2018) (explaining why there is less overt recourse to constitutionalism among
immigration officials compared with other agencies).
209. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
210. Id. at 230.
211. Id. at 226.
212. Id. at 226, 230.
213. Recognizing the limits of the Court’s holding, however, Justice Brennan acknowledged
that Congress, which has primary responsibility for immigration policy and includes
representatives of all states, retained the power under the Equal Protection Clause to enact such
exclusive policies if it wished. Id. at 225.
214. Supplementing this elaboration of Plyler, one can also view DACA as an extension of
the president’s authority to protect actual and intending Americans. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1,
64 (1889) (describing an episode in which President Franklin Pierce protected the Hungarian
refugee and intending American citizen Martin Koszta as support for presidential power to protect
federal officials). See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1993) (arguing that there is essentially no presidential law-making power).
Others have studied whether the President has constitutional power to decide how or if to enforce
the law. Compare Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 671, 674–75 (2014) (suggesting constitutional limits on any such power), with Kate Andrias,
The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1035–36 (2013) (arguing for a
broader conception). Many of these arguments also touch on which conception best promotes the
rule of law. See David S. Rubenstein, Taking Care of the Rule of Law, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
168, 170–71 (2018) (noting contradictions in arguments, practice, and rhetoric regarding the rule
of law).
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granted.”215 Taking this exclusionary path, Obama grimly predicted,
would create a “servant class in our midst” and spawn “inequality
that . . . feeds racial strife.”216 President Obama’s 2012 op-ed heralding
DACA’s roll-out invoked this vision of equality even more forthrightly,
framing DACA’s beneficiaries as “young people who study in our
schools, play in our neighborhoods, are friends with our kids, and pledge
allegiance to the flag.”217 Beneficiaries of DACA, President Obama
declared, “are Americans in their heart and minds, in every single way
but one: on paper.”218 For President Obama, DACA would resolve that
unjust anomaly.
B. The Structural Counter to Broad-Based Deferred Action
Yet, this assertion of equality had to compete with a structural
constitutionalist retort. Challengers of DACA and the much larger
program, DAPA, that President Obama sought to initiate in 2014,
grounded their critique in the separation of powers.219 On this view,
President Obama’s programs exceeded the bounds of executive
discretion.220 The Trump Administration initially relied in part on this
competing constitutionalist paradigm and later invoked a related statutory
argument citing doubts that Congress had delegated such broad-based
discretion to the agency.221
The statutory argument started with the Supreme Court’s nowfamiliar dictum that Congress does not customarily deposit “elephants in
mouseholes” by delegating boundless discretion to the executive through
ambiguous or generic statutory provisions.222 The Immigration and
215. BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 268 (2006).
216. Id.
217. See Barack Obama, A Nation of Laws and a Nation of Immigrants, TIME
(June 17, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/06/17/a-nation-of-laws-and-a-nation-of-immigrants/
[https://perma.cc/DBP6-UFUR].
218. Id.
219. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 180 (5th Cir. 2015); Blackman, supra note
204, at 217.
220. See Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action,
Unlawful Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (2015).
221. See Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 1 (asserting that both DAPA
and DACA did not fit the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA) “comprehensive scheme” and
that this mismatch with the statute raised “serious doubts about [DACA’s] legality”); see also
Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to James W.
McCament et al., Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca [https://perma.cc/GXK27WSJ] (citing statutory arguments and Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s claim that DACA was an
unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive branch). See generally Blackman, supra note
204 (framing the argument against DACA in both statutory and constitutional terms).
222. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
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Nationality Act (INA) is a carefully wrought structure that crafts specific
categories of legal status to accommodate several potentially conflicting
goals: family reunification, humanitarian values, economic prosperity,
and law enforcement. For example, requiring that U.S. citizens be at least
twenty-one years old to sponsor a parent for lawful permanent
residence223 addresses the so-called “anchor baby” problem by deterring
unlawful entrants from obtaining immigration benefits through a postentry U.S.-citizen child.224 The age floor was a key element of the 1965
immigration amendments, which repealed national origin quotas that for
decades had throttled legal immigration.225
Similarly, Congress has repeatedly warned that higher-than-specified
levels of immigration could roil the job market, impairing the
employment prospects and wage levels of U.S. citizens and lawful
permanent residents.226 That deep-seated legislative anxiety impelled the
1986 Congress to provide for sanctions on employers hiring
undocumented workers in a compromise that also provided immigrants
with a major victory by legalizing a substantial number of undocumented
persons living in the United States.227 In addition, Congress has restricted
the ability of noncitizens without a legal status to obtain relief such as a

223. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012); see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CHRISTINA M.
RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 251 (5th ed. 2009) (explaining the
immediate relative category).
224. Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Naturalization of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 20 (1965) (statement of Sen. Sam Ervin); see also id. at 230–
31 (colloquy between Senators Ervin and Robert F. Kennedy on rationale for age floor on U.S.
citizen sponsors); Margulies, supra note 220, at 1200–01 (discussing circumstances and results of
this exchange).
225. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New
Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 279, 297–98 (1996)
(describing the national origins quota system in place prior to the 1965 legislation).
226. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 108 (1996) (finding that access to U.S. jobs was a “magnet”
for unlawful migration).
227. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 201, 100 Stat.
3359, 3394; cf. S. REP. NO. 99-132, at 16 (1985) (describing the 1986 legalization as a “‘one-time
only’ program”). Seeking to reassure Congress and other stakeholders that grants of deferred
action, typically including a work permit, outside IRCA would be small in number, the Justice
Department stated in 1987 that the “number of aliens authorized to accept employment [pursuant
to deferred action outside IRCA] is quite small and the impact on the labor market is minimal.”
See Classes of Aliens Eligible, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,092, 46,092 (Dec. 4, 1987) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 109) (emphasis added). Indeed, officials claimed that the number of work authorizations was so
small that it was “previously considered to be not worth recording.” Id. at 46,093 (emphasis
added).
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reprieve from removal and a work permit.228 Sweeping awards of
deferred action risk eroding Congress’s limits.229
While Congress did mention “deferred action” in the INA, statutory
acknowledgment of this practice extends only to foreign nationals with a
clear pathway to a legal status.230 Apart from situations in which deferred
action is a “bridge” to a legal status, grants have been relatively rare,
typically responding to hardships such as illness or old age.231 DAPA was
to be a far larger program, and DACA also aids more immigrants than
traditional hardship-based relief.232 The size of each program
demonstrates its tensions with the statutory scheme. Virtually none of the
actual or prospective recipients of either program could have used
deferred action as a bridge to a legal status that would be available within
a reasonable time.233
At the same time, DACA recipients can invoke compelling equities.
First, as minors at the time of their entry into the United States, DACA
recipients simply complied with their parents’ instructions; they had no
legal or practical capacity to veto their parents’ plans. Second, as
228. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A) (curbing practice of immigration officials who had
granted extended voluntary departure (EVD) to individuals who did not fit into any established
visa category by limiting EVD to 120 days).
229. Cf. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 180 (5th Cir. 2015) (discussing basis for
holding that DAPA exceeded delegation). The Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel
memorandum supporting DAPA recognized the program’s impact. See Memorandum from Karl
R. Thompson, supra note 204, at 31 (acknowledging that “the potential size of the program is
large”).
230. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(d)(1), (2) (providing for stay of removal and acknowledging
availability of deferred action for applicants for visas created for victims of crime generally and
victims of trafficking in particular, so that applicants do not undergo hardship of removal as they
await processing of their applications); see also Texas, 809 F.3d at 184–85 (asserting that Family
Fairness program granting deferred action to spouses and children of those legalized in 1986 was
a “bridge[]” to legal status, since those legalized were already authorized to sponsor spouses and
children for permanent residence); cf. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and
Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 121 n.39 (2015) (arguing for broad presidential
discretion but acknowledging with respect to Family Fairness program that, “those legalized . . .
would become eligible to petition for the admission of their spouses and children through the
already existing immigration system” (emphasis added)).
231. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484 n.8 (1999)
(suggesting range of factors supporting grant of deferred action on a “case-by-case basis”); see
also WADHIA, supra note 204, at 28 (outlining the need for prosecutorial discretion when making
immigration-related decisions about noncitizens with severe medical illnesses).
232. See NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 461 (D.D.C. 2018) (noting that DACA
currently has over 800,000 recipients).
233. See Memorandum from Karl R. Thompson, supra note 204, at 29 n.14 (acknowledging
that express statutory requirements stemming from law enforcement concerns would “likely not
permit” prospective DAPA recipients to remain with their families “for the entire duration of the
time until a visa is awarded” and indeed would often mandate protracted separations).
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President Obama observed, DACA recipients have from an early age
developed social, educational, and cultural ties to the United States,234 but
conspicuously lack an ongoing relationship with their countries of origin.
For DACA recipients enrolled in the program since its inception in 2012,
participation in the program has deepened this disjuncture between ties
to the United States and lack of connection abroad. Compared with
DAPA, deferred action under DACA thus more closely parallels
immigration officials’ venerable practice of granting removable persons
relief from a range of hardships.235
This failure to address parallels between DACA and traditional uses
of deferred action erodes the rescission’s means–ends fit. Recall that
DHS Secretary Nielsen asserted that rescinding DACA would address
officials’ “serious doubts” about the program’s lawfulness.236 Secretary
Nielsen’s memorandum relied on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Texas v.
United States,237 holding that DAPA was not congruent with the INA’s
“comprehensive scheme.”238 However, Secretary Nielsen failed to
adequately address distinctions between DAPA and DACA.239 A fuller
explanation would have cemented the case for a rescission.240

234. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 204, at 2 (noting that many DACA
recipients “have already contributed to our country in significant ways”).
235. See WADHIA, supra note 204, at 57. But see Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 204, at 794–
95, 856 (asserting that DACA exceeded presidential authority).
236. Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 1, at 2.
237. 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
238. Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 1, at 2; see Texas, 809 F.3d at 179–
88.
239. See NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 472 (D.D.C. 2018).
240. See id. The Ninth Circuit has taken a narrower view of DHS’s options at this stage,
finding that DHS had to show not merely that questions existed about DACA’s legality, but that
the program was clearly unlawful. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
908 F.3d 476, 505–10 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding an APA violation); id. at 518–20 (finding that DHS
had to show DACA was clearly unlawful, also finding colorable equal protection violation). For
the reasons detailed in the text, the Ninth Circuit’s view unduly restricts DHS’s authority under
the INA and requires more than the Constitution compels. Along the same lines, the Ninth Circuit
needlessly hamstrung DHS by holding that the APA required the agency to comprehensively state
its rationale for rescission upon announcement of its decision, rather than permitting DHS to
supplement its decision when courts sought clarification. But see id. at 505 (arguing that under
the APA, DHS had to clearly state its reasons when announcing the rescission, and that DHS’s
pivot from a categorical judgment that DACA was unlawful to reliance on mere doubts about
DACA’s legality violated the principle articulated in the Supreme Court’s decision in SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), that an agency can justify an action only by citing reasons
that the agency considered before the action was taken). Under the view of the Constitution
expressed here, an agency would have a reasonable opportunity to refine its rationale, and an
initial judgment that a program was categorically unlawful would not undermine a subsequent
finding that the program triggered serious legal doubts.
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Concededly, as with DAPA, DACA engendered legal questions
because it announced “public policies of non-enforcement . . . for broad
classes and categories of” otherwise removable foreign nationals.241
However, the Nielsen memorandum did not fully address arguments for
DACA’s legality, including its overlap with ongoing use of prosecutorial
discretion to alleviate hardships such as youth, age, or disability.242 While
DHS might well be able to make such a showing, it has thus far failed to
do so. This failure would warrant halting the DACA rescission on equal
protection grounds, although a more detailed future explanation could
support the Administration’s decision.243
C. Rescinding Temporary Protected Status
The courts should also analyze under intermediate scrutiny the Trump
Administration’s rescission of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for
longtime recipients from Haiti, El Salvador, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua,
and Sudan. Generally, both an initial designation and a termination of
TPS would be discretionary decisions, subject to either relaxed review or
no review at all.244 However, the process of termination should be
reviewable if the challenger raises constitutional claims.245 The Trump
Administration’s termination of TPS to the above-mentioned countries

241. Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 1, at 2.
242. See WADHIA, supra note 204, at 57.
243. Challengers to the DACA rescission have made out a prima facie case of discriminatory
intent. As a backdrop, consider that 93% of DACA recipients are undocumented people of
Hispanic origin, generally from Mexico or Central America. See Regents, 908 F.3d at 518.
Candidate and now President Trump has showered insults on this group, referring to them as
rapists, human traffickers, drug dealers, gang members, and terrorists. See, e.g., id. at 519–20;
Michelle Mark, Trump Just Referred to One of His Most Infamous Comments: Calling Mexicans
‘Rapists,’ BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 5, 2018, 3:50 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trumpmexicans-rapists-remark-reference-2018-4 [https://perma.cc/4XEM-6KRC]. The Supreme Court
declined to view candidate and President Trump’s statements about Muslims as triggering
heightened scrutiny of the president’s travel ban. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419
(2018). However, candidate and President Trump’s statements on Central Americans and
Mexicans are more pervasive and personal. See Regents, 908 F.3d at 520 (suggesting that DACA
challengers provided “substantially greater evidence of discriminatory motivation”). Those
statements meet the challengers’ burden, if a court requires such a showing.
244. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) (2012) (precluding judicial review of decisions regarding
designation, extension, or termination of TPS).
245. See Saget v. Trump, 345 F. Supp. 3d 287, 294–96 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Saget, 375 F. Supp.
3d at 341–55 (granting a preliminary injunction against termination of TPS for Haitians); NAACP
v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 364 F. Supp. 3d 568, 576–78 (D. Md. 2019) (finding that plaintiffs
challenging revocation of TPS to Haitians had stated a plausible claim for relief). Acting due to
injunctions against termination of TPS, the Department of Homeland Security has extended TPS
for current recipients. See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Temporary Protected Status (2019),
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status [https://perma.cc/Y9NB-DJ49].
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was not a particularized decision, but a categorical pivot away from TPS
per se. That categorical pivot fails to fit means to ends.
TPS itself began, not as a statute, but as executive action.246 The
protective power of the presidency has constitutional roots in the
President’s authority over foreign affairs.247 For over 150 years,
presidents have protected intending Americans and those present in this
country from hostile sovereigns.248 The period of American dominance
after World War II saw greater use of this authority.249 Ultimately,
Congress codified presidential power to protect individuals coming from
abroad or already here from danger and hardship based on armed conflict,
natural disasters, or other “extraordinary and temporary conditions” that
impede foreign nationals from “returning . . . in safety” to their country
of origin.250 Even after Congress enacted the TPS provisions, presidents
have reserved to themselves constitutional power to take action that
supplements statutory protections.251
The challengers to the Trump Administration’s rescissions of TPS
argue that the Administration has not complied with comprehensive
statutory criteria in assessing the prospects for TPS recipients’ safe
return. In place of these comprehensive criteria, challengers allege that
the current Administration has focused in an arbitrary and artificial way
on whether the conditions that gave rise to the initial designation have
persisted.252 This narrower analysis precludes adequate consideration of
other factors, such as new natural disasters, that would make return
unsafe.253 The Trump Administration’s narrower approach erodes

246. See Margulies, supra note 22, at 107.
247. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63–64 (1890); Monaghan, supra note 214, at 3–5.
248. See Margulies, supra note 22, at 112–13.
249. See, e.g., id. at 127 (discussing the Bracero Program and its representation of the
president’s broad power).
250. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1) (2012).
251. See George H.W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990, THE AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Nov. 29, 1990), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19117
[https://perma.cc/HQ95-Q2F8] (asserting that the Executive might have constitutional power to
protect otherwise deportable foreign nationals facing exigent situations in their country of origin);
see also White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Memorandum – Deferred Enforced
Departure for Liberians, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2014/09/26/presidential-memorandum-deferred-enforced-departure-liberians
[https://perma.cc/SLR3-NLXA] (announcing relief from removal for Liberians who previously
had TPS and asserting “[his] constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United
States”).
252. Saget v. Trump, 345 F. Supp. 3d 287, 287, 294, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
253. Centro Presente v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 332 F. Supp. 3d 393, 402–04 (D. Mass.
2018).
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statutory protections, according to the challengers, and amounts to a
rewriting of the TPS provisions. 254
In addition to making this constitutional argument, the challengers
also cite the collateral impact caused by the rescissions of TPS.255 In
many cases, TPS recipients have been in the United States for well over
a decade and in some cases, have resided in the United States for an even
longer period of time.256 In the course of that stay, TPS recipients have
developed ties to persons and entities in the United States.257 That process
has been reciprocal. As a result, the collateral impact of a paradigm shift
in TPS criteria equals or exceeds the impact of DACA’s rescission.
The Trump Administration can point to a competing vision of
administrative constitutionalism also centered on government
responsibility. Generally, administration officials have argued that their
determinations have been consistent with statutory criteria. However, one
could also argue that the Trump Administration is seeking a sea change
that will protect U.S. sovereignty from a slow-motion surrender to
incursions from foreign nationals whose presence was supposed to be
“temporary.” As time passes, that presence seems more and more
permanent. Arguably, the slide into permanence does violence to the
statutory scheme and to U.S. sovereign prerogatives, which the Trump
Administration wishes to reassert. The Administration’s allusion in
correspondence to an “America first” perspective on TPS reinforces this
trope.258
While this justification for rescission invokes the federal
government’s responsibility, exercising that responsibility here is
inconsistent with a categorical judgment to terminate TPS. Rather, the
Due Process Clause requires that the Administration consider each TPS
country designation, extension, and termination separately on its

254. Saget, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 299.
255. Id. See generally Amanda Baran et al., The Cost to Taxpayers, GDP, and Businesses
of Ending TPS, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (Apr. 2017), https://www.ilrc.org/
sites/default/files/resources/2017-04-18_economic_contributions_by_salvadoran_honduran_
and_haitian_tps_holders.pdf. [https://perma.cc/3K8L-GQRB] (summarizing some of the impact
caused by the rescissions of TPS).
256. Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, A Statistical and Demographic Profile of the US
Temporary Protected Status Populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti, 5 JMHS
577, 578 (2017), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/233150241700500302 [https://
perma.cc/Z67A-PZGC].
257. See The Consequences of Terminating Temporary Protected Status, CATH. LEGAL
IMMIGR. NETWORK, INC. 3, https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/resources/The-Consequencesof-Terminating-Temporary-Protected-Status.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD4K-9ZBY].
258. See Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (emphasis
omitted).
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merits.259 The statute contemplates a look at whether TPS still serves the
statutory criteria, including whether TPS recipients can return in
safety.260 For example, regarding Haiti, DHS would consider whether
safe return was impossible in light of post-designation conditions,
including a devastating hurricane and a cholera epidemic.261
Instead, evidence submitted in each of the cases suggests that DHS,
guided by the White House, first decided to terminate TPS for virtually
all countries that have had it and then engaged in a narrow review that
omitted the “return in safety” condition.262 That is not a narrowly tailored
review of individual TPS designations; it is a wholesale pivot divorced
from the merits and a “strong break with past practice.”263 More
importantly, it fails means–ends scrutiny. Under the approach taken here,
DHS could revise its finding to include all current factors that imperil
safe return, whether or not they existed at the time of the initial
designation. That solution ensures due deliberation, but also provides
sufficient space for administrative discretion in a democracy.264
CONCLUSION
If this Article has covered a lot of substantive ground, it is because the
Trump Administration has endeavored to do the same as it rescinds
programs, policies, and practices of previous administrations. Of course,
the latter is not necessarily imprudent or unlawful. Indeed, competition
about programs and priorities is the essence of democracy. Often, law
will have little to say, and the courts no role to play. However, this Article
259. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–33 (1982) (holding that due process applied
in the case of a lawful permanent resident returning to United States). Equal protection is also
relevant here to the extent that TPS recipients subject to a categorical termination of their status
are—as a group—being treated differently than earlier TPS recipients.
260. See Saget, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 287, 292, 298, 299.
261. Id. at 299.
262. Ramos, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1099 (finding that then-DHS Secretary Elaine Duke was
informed by the White House of a “strategy” that apparently involved categorical judgment to
terminate TPS). As noted with respect to Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross’s contacts on the
census with other officials outside the Department of Commerce, senior officials can convey
White House priorities to others in the administration. However, that communication should not
include ordering officials to disregard statutory mandates. See supra Section III.B.
263. Ramos, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 1104 (quoting Degen Decl., Ex. 30).
264. If the challengers had to first make a prima facie showing of intent, they could cite to
statements by President Trump. See Saget, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 303 (noting that upon learning
15,000 Haitians had obtained visas in 2017, Trump allegedly said “they all have AIDS”) (quoting
First Amended Complaint at 18, Saget v. Trump, 345 F. Supp. 3d 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:18cv-01599)). As with DACA, these statements are more pervasive than those in the travel ban case,
and also address persons already living in the United States. Cf. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392,
2418 (2018) (cautioning about “delicate” task of parsing candidates’ and officials’ statements).
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argues that judicial review should be robust in assessing threshold
rescissions.
Threshold measures include baseline criteria for institutional
participation, as well as rules governing access to political representation
and to the ability to live and work in the United States. Rescinding these
measures upsets reliance interests. Because of the factfinding already
invested in such rules and the legislative support they enjoy, courts should
shift their familiar deferential stance to more exacting scrutiny of
threshold rescissions’ means–ends fit.
This Article’s approach also aims to provide a normative facet to
scholarly discussions of administrative constitutionalism. Scholars have
recently pointed to compelling examples of agencies interpreting the
Constitution outside of the courts to promote certain policies.265 Instances
include expanding the definition of conscientious objection to the draft,
curbing unfair state welfare policies, and promoting equal employment
opportunity.266 In each case, officials, including future Justices
Frankfurter and Stone in the conscientious objector example, went
beyond what courts had mandated and implemented a distinctively
administrative vision of the Constitution.
The administrative constitutionalism literature is still in an early stage
of development and also has focused most intently on descriptions of the
resourceful and dedicated public servants described above. It therefore
has spent less time on normative issues. For example, scholars have not
advanced criteria for ranking disparate administrative constitutionalist
visions. That task is important, because one constitutionalist vision will
often trigger contending visions. Those contending approaches will each
cite the government’s constitutional responsibilities, the limits of
government power, and the rights of others. In addressing threshold
rescissions proposed by the Trump Administration, this Article seeks to
fill that gap.
In responding to threshold rescissions such as the Trump
Administration’s pivots on military transgender policy, the census,
DACA, and TPS, the approach taken here subjects these moves to
intermediate scrutiny. Courts should consider the means–ends fit of these
shifts, ensuring that each is adequately tailored to a significant
government objective. In the case of military transgender policy, tailoring
would disaggregate the Department of Defense’s rollback, which already
correctly grandfathers in service members who acted in reliance on the
Obama Administration’s reforms. The longer stability requirement for
accession would pass muster, but other components of the 2018
265. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 17, at 1112.
266. See generally, e.g., Lee, supra note 21 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of
equal employment opportunity); Tani, Administrative Equal Protection, supra note 17 (discussing
this phenomenon in the context of welfare programs).
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Department of Defense policy would fall, including the bar on retention
of service members who require accommodations for their expressed
gender in bunking, bathroom use, and showering. Much of the 2018
policy, despite its drafting through a review process, does not effectively
counter the common-sense arguments for inclusion made by Obama
Administration Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, including Secretary
Carter’s argument that base rates are manageable and inclusion best
allows the military to address the needs of transgender individuals who
already serve.
On the census, DACA, and TPS, the approach taken here centers on
the process for reaching and explaining a decision. As Chief Justice
Roberts explained in the census case, the government’s putative goal of
enhancing VRA enforcement through asking a citizenship question was
“contrived” in light of the process used to assert that rationale.267 On
DACA and TPS, DHS must provide fuller explanations: respectively
addressing parallels between DACA and prior permissible uses of
deferred action, and factors that interfere with TPS recipients’ safe return,
even when those factors were not present at the time of the initial TPS
designation.
The approach taken here will not unduly burden incoming
administrations. Often, as in the case of the 2018 Department of Defense
policy’s rule on accession and stability, means–ends scrutiny will uphold
the change. In other cases, such as DACA and TPS, compliance will
entail more comprehensive explanation. That burden is not unreasonable
in a constitutional democracy. Perhaps the prospect of deeper public
explanation will lead to the rethinking of some substantive measures. But
that moderating influence is precisely what the Framers intended. Some
administrations will deem it prudent to dial back their rhetoric to avoid
promising more than they can deliver. That is an added virtue in a system
that values continuity as well as discretion. Indeed, tempering rhetorical
excesses may allow each side to more fully explore the other’s vision of
administrative constitutionalism. That, too, would match the Framers’
design.

267. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019).
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